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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) and
§ 78-2A-3(2)(h).

This appeal was from a district court to the

Utah Supreme Court and was transferred by the Supreme Court to
the Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2A-3(2)(h) and pursuant to Rule 4A of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and Rule 4A of the Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS ^ELOW
This appeal is from a judgment on a jury verdict rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against defendants and from the trial
court's denial of plaintifffs motion for new trial or additur.
Plaintiff filed an action in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, alleging personal
injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident.
The action was the subject of a jury trial from February 2
to February 18, 1987.

The jury apportioned seventy-five percent

of the fault in causing the accident to defendants and
twenty-five percent to plaintiff.

The jury found total damages

of $16,850.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.
Was plaintiff prejudiced or denied a fair trial by any
statements or conduct of the trial court?
2.
Is plaintiff's claim of prejudice resulting from the
conduct of the trial judge barred by his failure to object to the
conduct at trial?
3.
Did the trial court err in refusing to exclude the
testimony of Lincoln Clark, M.D.?

1

4.
Did the trial court err in excluding evidence sought to
be admitted by plaintiff?
5.
Did the trial court err in submitting to the jury the
issue of the relative degrees of fault of plaintiff and of
defendant Bates?
6.
Was the verdict of the jury with regard to fault and
damages supported by the evidence?
7.
Did the trial court err in failing to grant plaintiff's
motions for new trial or additur?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed an action in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, alleging personal
injuries resulting from a two vehicle accident which occurred on
June 15, 1984.

Plaintiff alleged he suffered a "closed head

brain injury" and a low back injury.
The action was the subject of a jury trial from February 2
to February 18, 1987.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of

plaintiff finding that defendant Bates was seventy-five percent
at fault in the causing of the accident and determining that
plaintiff had suffered damages totaling $16,850.00.

The damages

awarded to plaintiff were reduced by twenty-five percent by
reason of the negligence attributed to plaintiff by the jury.
Plaintiff's motions for new trial or for an additur were
denied by the trial court.
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment on the jury verdict and
from the order denying the motion for new trial or for additur.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
LIABILITY
This action arises from a two vehicle accident which occurred
on June 15, 1984, on 900 East Street near its intersection with
2

Fort Union Boulevard (7105 South), Salt Lake County, Utah.

In

the vicinity of the accident scene, 900 East has two north-bound
travel lanes and a left turn lane; the north-bound lanes of
travel are separated from the south-bound lanes by a slightly
elevated median divider.

(Exh. 5—Investigating Officer's

Accident Report; a copy is attached as Appendix A.)
Plaintiff was driving his 1978 AMC Concord in the inside
north-bound lane of 900 East.

(Exh.5)

Plaintiff was traveling

from his place of employment at a construction project at approximately 8000 South and 100 East (T. 162) and was traveling to his
home at 914 Paris Lane (4390 South) for lunch. (T. 181) As
Plaintiff approached the intersection, his speed was forty-five
miles per hour (T. 181) .
Defendant Pam Bates, operating a 1983 Honda automobile, was
exiting a parking lot from a driveway located on the east side of
900 East and south of the intersection with Fort Union Boulevard.
(Exh. 5)

Mrs. Bates was intending to make a left turn off of 900

East to travel west-bound on Fort Union Boulevard to deliver
documents to her husband, the vice-president of Pro Roofing. (T.
J96-97)
Defendant Bates pulled from the driveway and crossed the two
travel lanes to enter the left turn lane; her speed was approximately ten to fifteen miles per hour.

(Exh. 5, T. K46)

Plaintiff saw the Bates vehicle in the roadway and swerved
and braked (T. 182) leaving a relatively Straight skid mark
approximately 105 feet in length. (Exh. 5, T. A54-56)

At impact,

the Bates vehicle was pointed essentially north (Exh. 5 ) ; the

3

right side of plaintiff's vehicle struck the left rear of the
Bates' vehicle at a shallow angle.

(Exh. 5)

The speed differen-

tial between the two vehicles at the moment of impact was approximately ten miles per hour.

(T. K46)

brushing nature.

The body damage to plaintiff's

(T. K42)

The impact was of a slight

vehicle is reflected in Exhibit 2A; a copy of that photograph is
attached as Appendix B.
The left turn lane on 900 East begins approximately 110 feet
from the intersection; the skid mark from the left front tire of
plaintiff's vehicle begins approximately 170 feet from the
intersection; the impact occurred approximately 100 feet from the
intersection.

(Exh. 5; Exh. 151—A scale diagram of the accident

scene prepared by Frank Grant.)
Plaintiff's version of the accident was given in great
detail on both direct and cross examination. (T. 181-83 and
1147-48)

He was traveling to the left of a large truck. Plaintiff

contends that at a point 100 to 200 yards from the intersection
the truck signaled for a right turn and then suddenly stopped.
Plaintiff then saw the Bates vehicle crossing the road in front
of him.

Plaintiff contends he swerved to the left and went over

the median; his car came to a sudden stop and then turned straight
to the right and back onto the road.

Plaintiff testified he the

stepped on his brakes and stopped and saw the Bates vehicle
behind him in the north-bound land; plaintiff's vehicle was in
the left turn lane.

Plaintiff saw cars behind him in the left

turn lane, so he pulled in front of the Bates vehicle.
181-83)

(T.

Plaintiff contends his car went onto the median before

4

impact.

(T. 185)

Plaintiff claims he was dazed and sat in his

car for "a couple of minutes" before getting out (T. 188)
The investigating officer, Deputy Leavitt, testified that
the physical evidence at the scene consisted of the damage to the
vehicles and a skid mark on the road surface. (T. A44)
Leavitt also talked to the parties involved. (T. A44-45)

Deputy
The

skid mark was one hundred-five feet in length as measured by
Deputy Leavitt (T. A54)

There was no bredk in the skid, but

there was a deviation in the skid to the left probably indicating
the point of impact between the two vehicles.

(T. A5 6)

The skid

mark appeared to be from the left front tire of plaintiff's
vehicle.

(T. A57)

Deputy Leavitt's opinion of the speed of

plaintiff's vehicle prior to the accident was between forty and
forty-five miles per hour.

Deputy Leavitt was of the opinion

that the speed of plaintiff's vehicle at the time of impact was
between fifteen to twenty miles per hour maximum; he was of the
opinion that the speed of the Bates' vehicle at the time of
impact was approximately ten miles per hour.

(T. C69)

Deputy

Leavitt did not observe any skid mark other than the one drawn on
his accident report diagram; he had no reason to believe that the
skid mark was from other than the left side of plaintiff's
vehicle.

(T. C87)

Deputy Leavitt did not observe any physical

evidence to indicate that the left wheel of the plaintiff's
vehicle went on the median.

(T. C92)

On redirect examination by

plaintiff's counsel, Deputy Leavitt testified that at the time of
the accident 900 East Street was a busy, heavily travelled major
road with two or three shopping centers and a school nearby.
C91)
5

(T.

Frank Grant, an expert in accident reconstruction testifying
on behalf of defendants, rendered his opinion that the speed of
plaintiff's vehicle prior to the time he undertook any braking or
evasive action was forty-five miles per hour.

(T. K43)

Mr.

Grant rendered his opinion that the speed of the Bates vehicle at
the time of impact was fifteen miles per hour or less and the
plaintiff's vehicle was traveling approximately ten miles per
hour faster than the Bates1 vehicle.

(T. K46)

Mr. Grant rendered

his opinion that there was nothing to indicate that plaintiff's
vehicle went onto the median.

(T. K46-47)

Mr. Grant rendered

his opinion that the accident was caused by defendant Bates
making a wide right turn and by plaintiff traveling too fast for
the conditions existing at the scene. (T. K49-50)

Mrs. Bates

testified that immediately following the impact, the Onyeabor
vehicle was located behind hers.

(T. L20)

Phillip Bates, Pam's

husband, arrived at the scene approximately ten minutes after the
accident occurred (T. L54) and observed the location, of both of
the vehicles involved in the accident.

(T. L56-57)

On cross-

examination, Mr. Bates estimated the distance between the intersection and the Bates vehicle, which had not been moved, as not
quite 100 feet. (T. L61)
Plaintiff's accident reconstruction witness, Dennis Andrews,
testified that a driver's normal reaction time is one second;
reaction time is the time it takes a driver to recognize a hazard
and then apply the brakes.

(T. C114)

Mr. Andrews rendered his

opinion that the left front wheel of plaintiff's vehicle went up
and onto the center divider (T. C118).

He testified that at

impact, the speed of plaintiff's vehicle was thirty-three miles
6

per hour (T. C106) and the northward speed of the Bates vehicle
at impact was five miles per hour (T. C108) resulting in a speed
differential at impact of twenty-eight miles per hour.
Injuries and Damages
Dr. Edward Spencer, an orthopedic specialist called by
defendants, initially examined plaintiff in January 1985 and
diagnosed a degenerative lumbar disc.

While Dr. Spencer felt the

degenerative disc might or might not have related to the
automobile accident, he assumed it to be because of a denial by
plaintiff of earlier back problems.

Initially, Dr. Spencer gave

the plaintiff a five percent permanent partial impairment rating.
(T. 110-11)

Following a subsequent examination in April 1986,

Dr. Spencer was of the opinion that there was a large element of
psychogenic pain as a cause or source of plaintiff's complaints;
psychogenic pain is pain without an objective basis; that is,
with an emotional cause or voluntary cause. (T. 118)

Dr. Spencer

revised his earlier impairment rating to ten percent based on
reduced motion; however, Dr. Spencer noted that the impairment
rating was based on voluntary movement and was flawed because it
required plaintiff's control and might not be an accurate measure
of his true impairment.

Dr. Spencer also testified that if

plaintiff followed an exercise program he would probably return
to the original five percent impairment.

(T. 118-19)

Dr.

Spencer also stated on cross-examination that if plaintiff had
surgery on the herniated disc with a good result, his impairment
may be five percent.

(T. 122)

Dr. Spencer did acknowledge that

if plaintiff had ongoing pain and limited range of motion following
the surgery he would give the plaintiff a ten percent permanent
7

impairment rating. (T. 124)

On cross-examination, Dr. Spencer

testified that he couldn't say the back problem was definitely
caused by the auto accident; he assumed it was caused by the auto
accident because he had no earlier medical records or history of
an earlier injury or trouble. (T. 136)
A CT scan examination of the plaintiff on August 31, 1984,
revealed a "bulging disc."

(Exh. 34)

A CT scan nine months

later on May 13, 1985, indicated a disc herniation.

(Exh. 49)

Thomas Soderberg, M.D., plaintifffs orthopedic specialist,
testified that a bulging disc would generally be considered to be
milder in degree than a herniated disc.

(T. D374)

Dr. Soderberg

testified that the most common cause of a bulging disc is a
compression type of injury where a load is applied, particularly
if associated with some bending; he acknowledged that compression
and bending and lifting heavy weights could cause a bulging disc
as could a slip and fall, an auto accident or a sports injury;
certainly such injury was not related to auto accidents alone.
(T. D375)

There was substantial evidence that prior to the

accident plaintiff had engaged in much heavy lifting (T. D305,
D311, J75 and J89) including lifting one end of a piano by
himself while two men lifted the other end. (T. J91)
Thomas Houts, M.D., a neurologist, was plaintiff's first
treating physician.
29, 1984. (T. G8)

Dr. Houts first saw the plaintiff on August

Following the examination and review of a CT

scan of the lower back on September 7, 19 84, Dr. Houts diagnosed
a lumbar strain of a muscular nature and a herniated disc.

Dr.

Houts assumed that the back complaints related to the auto
accident based upon plaintiff's denial of prior back pain.
8

Dr.

Houts prescribed bed rest and muscle relaxants as treatment.
G12-13)

(T.

Dr. Houts next saw plaintiff on September 20, 1984; at

that time plaintiff was normal and he was released to return to
activity.

(T. G13-14)

Dr. Houts next saw plaintiff on February

1, 1985; at that time plaintiff reported that his back had been
bothering him for about three months and that the back had
aggravated or flared-up in a karate class.

(T. G14-15)

Plaintiff's claim of closed-head brain injury was substantially disputed by the evidence.

Plaintiff claimed that in the

collision with defendant's automobile, his automobile was thrown
onto and off of the median causing him to strike his head on the
interior of the vehicle.

The evidence reflected that plaintiff

exited his car and was pounding on the window of defendant's
Bates vehicle and yelling obscenities at her within five seconds
after the vehicle came to rest.

(T. L20-21)

Within fifteen

minutes after the occurrence of the accident, Phillip Bates was
in close proximity to plaintiff; he did not observe any injury to
plaintiff's head or face.

(T. L26)

Deputy Leavitt did not

observe any apparent difficulties on plaintiff's part in verbally
reporting to him about the accident or in making a written
statement; the plaintiff denied any injury and Deputy Leavitt did
not observe any injury to plaintiff.

(T. C88-89)

At his first

visit to Dr. Houts on August 29, 1984, plaintiff told Dr. Houts
he had been severely jostled or jarred, but denied striking any
portion of his body inside the car.

(T. G9-10.)

Dr. Houts did

not observe any evidence of memory loss or confusion during his
course of treatment of plaintiff.

(T. G17-18)

There was no

evidence of any loss of consciousness by plaintiff in the accident.
9

Plaintiff complained of intellectual impairment following
the accident.

However, for example, the transcript of plaintiff's

grades at Utah Technical College (Exh. 21), which he attended
prior to the accident, reveals class grades and grade point
averages substantially the same as the transcript of grades at
the University of Utah (Exh. 23), which he attended after the
accident.

This is so even though the classes at the University

were of a more difficult nature.
Prior to the accident, plaintiff was attending school on a
full-time basis.

For several days prior to the accident he had

worked as a rough carpenter on a construction project.

(T. 167)

Plaintiff was initially paid $8.00 per hour, but his wage was
reduced to $5.00 per hour because of his slowness on the job.
(T. 164-67)

His prior employment had been of a sporadic and

short term nature with wages typically in the $4.00—$5.00 per
hour range; he was seldom employed in the construction industry.
(Exh. 143).
LINCOLN CLARK, M.D. AS A WITNESS
Defendants' amended witness and exhibit list containing Dr.
Clark's name was filed and served on January 21, 1987.

The

proposed pretrial order signed by both counsel on November 6,
1986, (R. 228-248) provided that at least ten days prior to
trial, each party would serve upon opposing counsel a list of all
witnesses who would or might be called at trial.

(R. 246)

The

order did provide the list should be mailed at least thirteen
days prior to trial to insure that opposing counsel would receive
it at least eleven days prior to trial; plaintiff's counsel
acknowledges receiving that list on the January 22, ten days
10

prior to trial.

(Appellant's Brief p. 80)

Defendants concede that at a hearing on December 5, 198 6,
Dr. Clark stated he would not testify in the action.

At that

hearing, Dr. Clark stated that after examining the plaintiff and
based on his professional experience, including testimony in
major criminal and in civil commitment hearings, the plaintiff
constituted a threat to him, his family, to defendant Bates and
to Dr. Thomas Houts and that Dr. Clark's appearance as a witness
at trial opposing the plaintiff would place himself and his wife
in physical jeopardy (T. S4-10; S13-15)

Subsequent events caused

Dr. Clark to determine that he could appear as a witness in the
case without exposing himself to an unreasonable risk of harm.
(T. L124-29)

Plaintiff's counsel also perceived the potential

risk of harm to Dr. Clark as is indicated by a series of questions
and answers in which Mr. Sykes phoned a warning to Dr. Clark
after receiving a phone call from plaintiff's wife. (T. L132-33.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Plaintiff contends that the trial court commented, both

verbally and non-verbally, on the evidence.

Although numerous

"comments" are claimed plaintiff made no objections at trial. The
claim of error was made for the first time in plaintiff's motion
for new trial. Even so, the trial court instructed the jury that
anything said or done by the court during the course of the trial
should not be considered as indicating the court's view as to any
issue.

A review of the so-called "comments", within context of

the questions, testimony and objections made at the time, reveal
that such "comments" were statements neuttal in content and tone
and within the discretion of the trial court.
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2.

The withdrawal of Dr. Lincoln Clark as a witness was

precipitated by the plaintiff's conduct which Dr. Clark assessed
as a threat to himself and his family.

When Dr. Clark subsequently

concluded he could appear as a witness, timely notice of his
appearance was given to plaintiff's counsel. A copy of Dr. Clark's
written report was furnished to plaintiff's counsel on February
4, 1987, as provided by the order of the trial court in connection
with its denial of plaintiff's motion in limine. Plaintiff's
counsel conducted a lengthy and learned cross-examination of Dr.
Clark at trial.

The trial court's refusal to exclude Dr. Clark's

testimony was proper, particularly so in light of the fact that
Dr. Clark's initial withdrawal as a witness was precipitated by
plaintiff's own conduct.
3.

The trial court's exclusion of exhibits and testimony

was proper; such exclusion did not prejudice plaintiff.
4.

There was conflicting evidence with regard to the

occurrence of the accident. The question of the reasonableness of
the conduct of plaintiff and defendant in operating their vehicles
was one for the jury. The court properly instructed the jury as
to the duties of the parties on the issue of liability.
5.

The nature and extent of any injury suffered by plaintiff

was sharply contested.

Substantial evidence was introduced from

which the jury could properly determine that plaintiff's back
injuries were substantially less severe than he claimed.

The

jury could conclude from the evidence that plaintiff did not
suffer any brain injury. The trial court properly concluded that
the negligence attributed by the jury to plaintiff and the amount
of damages awarded were supported by the evidence and the trial
12

court properly refused to grant an additur or a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF RECEIVED A FAIR TRIAL AND WAS NOT
PREJUDICED BY ANY CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE.
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW
Under Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

,f

[t]he court

shall not comment on the evidence in the case . . . ."

The Utah

Supreme Court has defined this prohibited behavior as:
[C]ommenting on the quality or Credibility of
the evidence in such a way as to indicate
that the trial court favors the claims or
position of either party.
State v. Sanders, 27 Utah 2nd 354, 496 P.2d 270, 275 (1972); see
also, State v. Long, 721 P.2d 493, 496 (Utah 1986) (Hall, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting) .
This rule, however, does not prohibit the court from including "general statements concerning certain types of evidence, nor
concerning the burdens of proof and sometimes varying degrees of
proof required."

Id.

Nor does the rule prevent the trial court

from expressing the reasons for its decisions on motions, objections, and the like.
406, 408 (1963).

Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d.

See also, Vegodsky v. City of Tucson, 1 Ariz.

App. 102, 399 P.2d 723 (1965).

This is especially true where the

jury is subsequently instructed that the court did not intend to
invade their province of judging the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight of the evidence.

Ortega, 383 P.2d 406.

Mahoney v. Mitchell, 668 P.2d 35 (Haw. App. 1983).

See also,

Further, the

trial court's actions have been upheld where the court commented
that the evidence "did not show much" was true, Hogqe v. Salt
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Lake and O.RY. Co., 47 Utah 266, 153 P. 585 (1915), and where the
court asked counsel whether or not a matter was objectionable,
Paul v. Zions First National Bank, 18 Utah 2d 183, 417 P.2d 759
(1966) .
Furthermore, it is not improper for the trial court to
question the witnesses.

State v. Mellon, 583 P.2d 46, 48 (Utah

1978); Cintron v. Milkovich, 611 P.2d 730 (Utah 1980).

In order

for such questioning by the trial court to be overturned as
improper, it must go "beyond clarification, explanation, or
addition to the evidence," or show prejudice to one party's
claim.

Id.

The trial court has significant discretion in conducting the
course of the trial.

In Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190

P.2d 520 (1948), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
But we must keep in mind that judges may not
sit as sphinxes on the bench nor should they
be near umpires. They should, to a certain
extent, guide the course of the trial and
when a witness is wandering or digressing,
tactfully bring him back into line.
Id. at 525.
If, however, it is established that the trial court has
committed error the question becomes "whether there was any error
of a sufficiently substantial nature that it is reasonable to
believe that it adversely affected the appellant or deprived him
of a fair trial in such a way that in the absence of such error
there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been
different."

Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811,

814 (1972).

See also, Ortega v. Thomas, 383 P.2d 406 (Utah

1963) .
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Finally, if a trial court has erred by actually commenting
on the evidence, it is imperative that the counsel object to such
comment and conduct.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated:

It would be manifestly unjust to permit a
party to sit silently by, believing that
prejudicial error had been committed, to see
the trial to its completion, and allow the
jury to deliberate and reach a verdict, to
see if he wins, then if he loses, come
forward with a claim that such an error
rendered the verdict a nullity. If this
could be done, proceedings after such an
occurrence would be in vain and thus an
imposition upon the court, the jury and all
concerned. The court will not countenance
any such mockery of its proceedings. If
something occurs which the party thinks is
wrong and so prejudicial to him that he
thereafter cannot have a fair trial, he must
make his objection promptly and seek redress
by moving for a mistrial, or by having
cautionary instructions given, if that is
deemed adequate, or be held to ^aive whatever
rights may have existed to do s0.
Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186, 188 (1962).

See

also, Meier v. Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 (1964).
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff devotes a substantial portion of his brief to his
contention that plaintiff was prejudiced by the conduct of the
trial court.

The alleged conduct includes: (1) direct comments

on the evidence, (2) sua sponte interjections by the trial judge,
(3) the demeanor and other non-verbal conduct of the trial judge
and (4) permitting arguments on evidence to be made in presence
of the jury.

Each of these four classes of alleged "comments" is

addressed individually and specifically below.

Preliminarily,

however, a few comments are in order.
A.

Extensiveness of Plaintiff's Presentation.

The case

was tried on February 2 through February 17, 1987, a total of
15

eleven trial days.

During the course of the trial, thirty-three

witnesses testified; twenty of them as experts.

Of the total

witnesses, plaintiff called twenty-six, of whom fifteen were
experts.
tiff's.

Additionally, 108 of 113 offered exhibits were plainOne hundred-six exhibits were admitted into evidence.

Plaintiff's case in chief lasted from February 2 until the
morning of February 12, 1987.

Virtually all of the testimony and

exhibits sought to be admitted by plaintiff were admitted during
the course of trial such that plaintiff's claims were fully and
completely presented to the jury.
B.

Waiver by Failing to Object.

As is noted in the

statement of applicable law, it is imperative that the party
complaining of such comments or conduct object thereto during the
course of the trial.

A review of the transcript, and particularly

those portions of the transcript included in the Appendix to
plaintiff's brief herein, does not disclose a single instance in
which the conduct now complained of was objected to or otherwise
called to the attention of the trial judge.
Plaintiff may not "sit silently by, believing that prejudicial
error has been committed, to see the trial to its completion, and
allow the jury to deliberate and reach a verdict, to see if he
wins, then if he loses, come forward with a claim that such an
error rendered the verdict a nullity."

Hill v. Cloward, 377 P.2d

188.
C.

Cautionary Jury Instruction.

In its charge to the

jury, the trial court included its Instruction No. 2 which
stated:
Anything done or said by me during the trial
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should not be considered by you as indicating
my view on any issue in this case. Any
belief you may have as to what my view may be
should receive no consideration by you in
your deliberations.
(R. 618)

Such a cautionary instruction is sufficient to advise

the jury that any conduct of the trial judge is not to be considered in any way by the jury in its deliberations.
CLAIMED DIRECT COMMENTS
Plaintiff claims that on fourteen occasions during the
course of the trial, the trial judge made direct comments upon
the evidence.

The portions of the trial transcript containing

the claimed comments are designated items 1 through 14 in the
Appendix to plaintiff's Brief.
A review of those portions of the transcript itself (rather
than plaintiff's "tables") reveal that virtually all of the
instances cited by plaintiff are not comments on the evidence but
are simply explanatory statements made by the court either in the
course of ruling on objections, or limiting the admissibility of
evidence or testimony, or clarifying the testimony given by a
witness.

Instances falling within this category are Appendix

items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14.
For example, as to Appendix item 2 plaintiff asserts in his
Table I that the trial judge cast doubt on the validity of the
expert's testimony as to the value of lost future earnings by
referring to it as "pure speculation".
"pure speculation"

The context of the phrase

was that plaintiff's counsel asked the

witness to calculate the plaintiff's lost future earnings by
assuming plaintiff would earn $6.00 per hour in the first year,
$10.00 per hour in the second year, $15.00 per hour in the third
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year and so on to a level of $40,000 per year in the tenth year.
Defendants objected that such incremental increases were without
support in the evidence.

In response to that objection, the

court stated:
It seems to me it is pure speculation that in
the first year he is going to make $6.00 an
hourf in the next year $10.00 an hour and the
next year $15.00 an hour. I think that is
pure speculation.
(T. K20)

Plaintiff also asserts with regard to Appendix item 2

that the trial court revealed his opinion of the plaintiff's
earning potential by allowing only testimony of $5.00 an hour to
be received.

Again, referring to the transcript for the proper

context, while the trial court sustained the defendants' objection
with regard to assuming incremental increases in the plaintiff's
income as being unsupported by the evidence (T. K21-22),

the

court did allow a calculation based upon $5.00 per hour, which
amount was supported by testimony as to plaintiff's earnings at
the time of the accident.

Mr. Fjelsted then testified that the

present value of future earnings paid on a weekly basis of
$200.00 during the plaintiff's 32.1 year life expectcincy would be
$212,689 (T. K23). Plaintiff's attorney did not attempt to
elicit from Mr. Fjelsted any other figures regarding the present
value of future earnings based on initial assumptions of other
than $5.00 per hour.

For this reason, there is no basis to

assert that the trial court allowed "only testimony of $5.00."
Similarly, Appendix item 5 is characterized by plaintiff as
a sua sponte opinion that one of plaintiff's witnesses, Linda
Gummow, a neuropsychologist, was not qualified to render an
opinion as to whether Mr. Onyeabor was unconscious at the scene
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because she was not present.

Viewing the court's comments in

proper context shows the court's dialogue had nothing to do with
Dr. Gummow's qualifications as a expert or the weight to be given
to her testimony.

The court was only limiting Dr. Gummow's

testimony on re-redirect to the scope of re-cross.

Defendants'

re-cross examination of that witness had been limited to the
inter-relationship of verifiable brain injury and length of
unconsciousness.

Plaintiff's re-redirect inquiry about "gradation11

of consciousness was clearly too broad.
Q [By Mr. Sykes]
What are some of the
gradations in loss of consciousness that
might apply to someone like Mr. Onyeabor?
MR. STEGALL:

The gradation?

Well, Your Honor, I think she answered
the question about what she was told,
and we're getting beyond - THE COURT:

Yes, I think so.

MR. STEGALL:

- - beyond that question.

MR. SYKES:
gradation.

Well, I just asked about the
Is that a —

THE COURT: You have had a witness here
that talked to him immediately after the
accident. And all she knows about
whether he experienced any unconsciousness or not is what he told her. She
wasn't there, and she's talked to him
about it. And she — that's all I'm
going to let her testify to, as to what
—
based upon what he told her, her
conclusion was as to whether or not he
did or did not lose consciousness.
MR. SYKES: Okay. I have no further
questions, Your Honor, of this witness.
(T. H28-31)
A review of the other Appendix items enumerated above (1-5,
7-11, 13 and 14) reveal that in the context of the questions, the
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answers, the objections and the statements by the court with
regard to those objections, the trial court was not commenting
upon the evidence, but was, rather, ruling upon objections,
limiting evidence to which objections had been made, or clarifying
testimony which had been given.
In addition to plaintiff's assertions that the trial court
commented on witness testimony, plaintiff asserts in his Table I
the trial court discredited documentary evidence by making
disparaging comments about the use of exhibit notebooks given to
jurors at the beginning of the trial and "severely scolded"
counsel in front of the jury (Appendix item 6 ) . The exhibit
notebooks referred to consisted of loose-leaf binders each
containing approximately seventy-six exhibits; the contents were
approximately two and one-half inches thick.

One such exhibit

notebook was given by plaintiff's counsel to each juror so that
reference could be made to specific exhibits as they were admitted.
Defendant's counsel opposed the use of the exhibit books prior to
and at a hearing on motions i_n limine on January 30, 1987.

At

that time, the trial judge expressed his concern that the notebooks
contained exhibits which might not be received and would be
distracting to the jury.

Plaintiff's counsel assured the trial

court that the exhibit notebooks could be used without distracting
the jury.

The trial judge did determine that he would permit

plaintiff to use the exhibit notebooks.

(T. Q55-59)

Plaintiff's Appendix item 6 relates to control of the use of
those exhibit notebooks by the trial court.

Earlier in the day

during Dr. Soderberg's testimony, reference was made to exhibit
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number 34, a written report of the CT examination performed on
the plaintiff.

The interchange between plaintiff's counsel was

as follows:
MR. SYKES: Your Honor, that is in the
books. And if it would be okay I'd like
to have the jury turn to that for a
moment.
JUDGE CROFT: Well, the Doctor's telling
them everything that's in it. I think
they can follow it. If they want to
look at it it's all right.

JUDGE CROFT: The trouble with them
trying to read what's in the exhibit is
they might miss the doctor's testimony.
And that's what they should hear.
(T. D325)
Shortly thereafter, Dr. Soderberg testified that he had
prescribed a cane for the plaintiff; the prescription was received
as exhibit number 52 and plaintiff's counsel stated:
MR. SYKES: I don't know if the jury has that
in their books. Could they check quickly?
JUDGE CROFT: Well, it is a prescription for
a cane. I don't think it's necessary that
they examine it, they will see it in the jury
room when they consider the case.
MR. SYKES:

Okay,

(T. D333)
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff's counsel made a reference
to exhibit 16, which stated in its entirety:

,f

Onyeabor today.

He should be able to

He has no health problems.

participate in all school activities."

I examined Mr.

At that point, the

following interchange occurred:
MR. SYKES: Okay. If you could turn to
exhibit 16 again—and may the jury also,
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Your Honor, turn to exhibit 16?
JUDGE CROFT:

If they wish.

(T. D348)
On redirect examination, Dr. Soderberg was asked to refer to
page one of exhibit 51, a four page office chart maintained by
Dr. Soderberg.

Again, plaintiff's counsel asked if the jury

could refer to the exhibit to which the trial judge replied:
JUDGE CROFT: If it's helpful. I don't know
that they need to look at the book every time
the Doctor says something about the exhibit.
(T. D382-383)
The witness following Dr. Soderberg was Doctor Gerald
Moress.

In redirect examination the doctor was asked to identify

an EMG report, exhibit 55.

Although not objecting to the receipt

of the exhibit, defendant's counsel did object to the line of
questions regarding it as being beyond the scope of crossexamination.

The trial court permitted Dr. Moress to be ques-

tioned concerning the EMG report at which point the following
occurred:
MR. SYKES: May we have the jury turn to
that, Your Honor, to 55?
JUDGE CROFT: Why don't you ask him the
question and I think the jury can get it
easier from what the doctor says than
they can trying to read what the book
says. And all of you follow what the
doctor is saying at the same time.
MR. SYKES: Your Honor, the only reason
I do that, I think it would be helpful
to see and hear at the same time.
JUDGE CROFT: Okay. Let's have an
understanding that any time the jury
wants to pick up the book to look at the
exhibit that the witness is talking
about you are free to do so, if you
90

don't want to you donft have to.
MR. SYKES: Okay. I think it would be
helpful in this case, Your Honor.
JUDGE CROFT: I'm going to let them make
the decision because they may not find
it that way.
(T. D443-44)
It is obvious from this history of events that the trial
judge was concerned the use of the exhibit notebooks was becoming
distracting to the jury.

Nonetheless, after consulting with

counsel that evening and the following morning, the trial court
did advise the jurors that they should, at the request of plaintiff's counsel, examine the exhibit being testified to.

He

advised them that when the request was made, the jury was to look
at the exhibit being considered, and when that exhibit was no
longer needed, to close the exhibit book and not look through it
further as there might be exhibits that were not yet in evidence.
(T. E491)

That procedure was followed by the court for the

remainder of the trial.

If the jury somehow perceived the trial

judge's statements in controlling the use of the notebooks as
disparaging, any such perception was cured by his directions on
the morning of the fourth day of trial.
The remaining Appendix item (12) in which a claimed direct
comment was made occurred during the testimony of Patrick Chukwu.
Plaintiff states that the trial judge referred to a Nigerian
witness as "these young ones" thus demeaning the witness and
other younger Nigerians who had previously testified.

Mr. Chukwu

was the third of three friends testifying for plaintiff; these
witnesses were Emmanuel Uzoh, age thirty-one years, Robert Otti,
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age thirty years and Mr. Chukwu, age thirty-two years.

A review

of their testimony reveals that all three witnesses tended to
give lengthy narrative responses to specific questions.

The

context of the specific instance complained of in Appendix 12 can
only be grasped by a review of the testimony preceeding it (T.
D20-95) which is contained in Appendix D to this brief.
As is seen from the transcript, for some period prior to the
statement by the trial court, Mr. Chukwu was giving long, involved,
narrative responses to specific questions.

Objections had been

made and the witness and plaintiff's counsel had been cautioned
with regard to responding to the specific question.

A similar

problem had occurred during the examination of the two prior
witnesses.

As a result, the trial judge's statement that the

"young ones tend to make a speech" was in fact an accurate
statement.

The term "young ones" was probably an unfortunate

choice of words by the trial judge, but it is certainly stretching
to describe the term as "demeaning" to Mr. Chukwu or to the other
witnesses.
SUA SPONTE INTERJECTIONS
Plaintiff claims that on approximately twenty-seven occasions
during the course of the trial the trial judge commented on the
evidence by making sua sponte interjections and interruptions.
Portions of the trial transcript containing the claimed comments
are designated as items 15 through 35 in the Appendix to plaintiff's brief.
A review of those portions of the transcript itself reveal
that many of the claimed comments were simply statements made by
the trial court properly requesting a witness to respond to the
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question which was asked.

The claimed comments falling within

this category are Appendix items 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 28 30 and
35.
By way of example, plaintiff asserts in Table II in Appendix
item 16 the trial court "interjected a comment to help the
defense and scolded the plaintiff's expert witness."

The

interchange in question is as follows:
Q [Mr. Stegall]
Were the test scores
helpful to him if he told you that he
was 580 and, in fact, was 563?
A [Mr. Zelig] I don't think there's a
significant difference between the two
scores. That's why I didn't pay too
much attention to it. I think it would
be an easy mistake to make, because they
were so close together.
THE COURT: That doesn't quite answer
his question, Doctor.
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. It is not
significant to me that there was
significance in those two scores.
(T. G95)
Another such example is Appendix item 17 characterized by
plaintiff in Table II as the trial court "interjecting to help
defense and questioning plaintiff's expert on the basis of the
expert's opinion."

The interchange in question is as follows:

Q [By Mr. Stegall] Okay. What did Mr.
Onyeabor tell you about the jobs he
held?
A [By Mr. Heal]
He described to me the
types of activities he performed in
Nigeria. In terms of estimating jobs or
working with customers, hiring workers,
training workers, securing materials and
equipment, and overseeing construction.
Q

You took those at face value?
0£

A

I suppose• The other information I
relied on was - THE COURT:
Just answer the question.
Did you take them at face value? That
is the question.

(T. J187)
Substantially all of the remaining claimed comments are,
upon examination, revealed to be proper statements by the trial
judge to administer in orderly fashion evidence being introduced
at trial.
For example, Appendix item 15 is characterized by plaintiff
in Table II as the trial judge "inviting defendants to object to
an expert's qualifications and casting doubt upon the expert's
qualifications."

A review of the transcript indicates that Dr.

Nielson testified very briefly concerning his professional
qualifications.

(T. D454)

In the interchange between the trial

judge and counsel complained of by plaintiff, the trial judge
clarified Dr. Nielson's qualifications to render opinion testimony
as follows:
JUDGE CROFT:
I assume, Mr. Stegall,
you are not objecting to lack of qualification testimony?
MR. STEGALL:
Your Honor, I understand
the gentleman is an ENT specialist and-JUDGE CROFT: You stipulate he is an
expert in that field.
MR. STEGALL:

in the field.

JUDGE CROFT: And can testify without
further foundation?
MR. STEGALL:

In audiology, Your Honor.
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JUDGE CROFT:
Sykes.

All right, go ahead, Mr.

In Appendix item 19, plaintiff complains that the trial
judge made a rude interjection implying that plaintiff's counsel
had suggested an answer to the witness.

The transcript reveals

that plaintiff's counsel had asked a series of leading questions
with regard to the calculation of the present value of future
payments.

(T. K5-7)

The interchange between plaintiff's counsel

and Mr. Fjelsted preceding the court's statement is as follows:
Q [By Mr. Sykes]
Okay. But just to
illustrate the principle of how you
arrive at that, what you are arriving at
is a discount rate?
A [By Mr. Fjelsted] Correct.
Q

Is that rate -- and I indicated earlier
my example if you wanted to get $10,000
of income in ten years — in the tenth
year, let's say, and you want to know
how much money, now you need to produce
that, you have to apply a discount rate?

A

Correct.

Q

And that's why it is a lesser amount of
money?

A

That is correct.

Q

But you get that discount rate?
THE COURT: Are you asking him or
telling him, Mr. Sykes?
MR. SYKES: Well, you get that discount
rate by taking the interest rate here
minus —
THE COURT:
it.
MR. SYKES:

Let him tell you how he does
All right.

(T. K8-9)
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Appendix item 24, is characterized by plaintiff as the trial
judge "questioning one of plaintiff's experts as to whether he
understands certain head injury terms."

A review of the transcript

(T. E494-497) reveals the plaintiff was seeking the admission of
a video tape and a medical glossary.

The glossary was to be used

by the jury to look up medical terminology used both in the video
tape and by the witness.

The trial judge suggested that the

witness endeavor to use plain English in his testimony rather
than have the jury attempt to remember terms and look up those
terms in a glossary.

(T. E495-96)

The following then occurred:

Q (By Mr. Sykes)
Tell us about the film
Who prepared it, when it was prepared
approximately and this sort of thing.
A

—

The film was prepared at the University
of Utah approximately, I'd say, about a
year ago or within the last year. It is
viewed predominently toward, for family
members or people that don't understand
brain injury and goes over, almost from
start to finish, of what happens. It
goes over all degrees of brain injury,
it describes it and some of the consequences and what happens. And it shows
it very vividly. And I think it is a
high quality film. Unfortunately, a
couple places get a little technical and
that's my only problem with it, Your
Honor, in one area where they go over
the anatomy. There is a neuroanatomist,
Dr. Susan Stenson, who is excellent but
she uses all the big terms. And I'd be
glad to define any at that time if it is
necessary.
MR. SYKES:

Perhaps —

JUDGE CROFT:
terms?

Well, you understand the

THE WITNESS:

Yes, I do, Your Honor.

JUDGE CROFT: If they need explaining
you can explain them to the jury, can't
you?
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THE WITNESS:

Yes, I can.

(T. E495-97) [Emphasis added]. Defendants' objection to the
glossary was sustained; the video film was admitted over defendants1 objection and was shown to the jury.

(T. E498-99)

From the context, it is evident the trial judge assumed the
witness was familiar with medical terminology and was clarifying
for the jury's benefit the fact the witness could help the jury
understand the video without resorting to a glossary.
Appendix item 25 is characterized by the plaintiff as the
trial judge "questioning a plaintiff's expert about something
which 'troubled' the trial court regarding the scope of a jury
decision to decide the case."

A review of the transcript reveals

that the court was properly troubled with regard to a statement
made by the witness which could have been perceived by the jury
as meaning the witness expected the jury to make a specific
finding in favor of plaintiff.

When asked about his opinion as

to whether the plaintiff had compensation syndrome, the following
interchange occurred:
A

(Dr. Nilsson)
Well, his — the majority
of my interactions have not been typical
of patients that I have followed who
have compensation syndrome in the sense
that he is more concerned that the truth
be shown, and that he is helped to be
more reassured of a good future, of
being able to care for his family. He
is very angry and he is very frustrated,
and sees a lot of the court proceeding
as an expression of that anger. But the
end result being a validation of yes,
you are injured and we will help you
with your problems.

[THE COURT:]
There was one comment
that the doctor made that troubled me
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just a little bit, and that was that he
expected this court to make a decision
one way or another with respect to a
particular injury. Did I misunderstand
you, Doctor?
THE WITNESS: It is not my expectation,
Your Honor, no. But yet I think from my
experience, head injury patients in
general tend to see this as a final
confrontation of proof. In fact, I have
some patients who totally will verbalize
this court will say whether I have a
head injury or not. And obviously that
is not the case.
THE COURT: Your answer wasn't based
upon the assumption that this court or
the jury would make any determination on
that, I guess; is that right?
THE WITNESS:
(T. J38-39)

That's correct.

[Emphasis added.]

Appendix Item 26 is characterized by plaintiff as the trial
court's "interjection to unnecessarily restrict redirect examination."

Dr. Duncan Wallace, a psychiatrist, had been cross-examined

by defendants with regard to the fact that Dr. Wallace was
himself a plaintiff in closed-head brain injury litigation.

Dr.

Linda Gummow, one of plaintiff Onyeabor's witnesses, was also a
witness in Dr. Wallace's litigation.

On redirect examination, to

rehabilitate Dr. Wallace, the witness was asked to distinguish
between his injury and that of Mr. Onyeabor and was then asked
about his own impairments.

Defendants' objection was overruled.

The witness described his impairments and difficulties for
several pages of transcript (T. F742-44) at which point the
complained of interchange occurred:
Q
A

(Mr. Sykes)

Did you have a drop in I.Q.?

Probably had about a 10 to 12 point
drop.

Q

What was your I.Q. before the incident?
JUDGE CROFT: I think thatfs going a
little bit far on it, Mr. Sykes.
MR. SYKES: Well, I would like to know
what his I.Q. is now because that does
relate to the type of report he may have
written here.
MR. STEGALL: I think that gets into a
lot of foundational questions we may not
be prepared to get into with this
witness. And —
MR. SYKES: I will withdraw the question,
it's not that important.
JUDGE CROFT: I think he's answered it
sufficiently.
MR. SYKES:

(T. F744-45)

Okay.

[Emphasis added.]

Plaintiff is complaining now of

testimony his counsel did not feel was important at trial.

The

witness had testified on direct as to his professional qualifications (T. E650-52) and on redirect as to his own impairments.
Inquiry on redirect examination apparently aimed solely at
bolstering the witness' testimony was properly terminated by the
court.
Appendix Item 27 is characterized by plaintiff as an interjection by the trial judge "to attempt to narrow the scope of an
answer by one of plaintiff's experts."

The transcript reveals

the witness was asked as to the number of his patients; the
question was ambiguous as to whether it referred to total patients
or brain injury patients.
clarify that ambiguity.

The trial judge was attempting to
(T. J8-9)

Appendix Item 31 is characterized as the trial judge "hassling" the witness as to the price of repair of his car's left
-n

front tire.

Two repair invoices (Exhibits 7 and 8) had just been

received without objection when the following occurred:
Q

(Mr. Sykes) Mr. Onyeabor, did you tell
us how much the amount of money was in
the tire — I don't recall if you said
that.
THE COURT: Well, the exhibit speaks for
itself. It is about $73.00.
MR. SYKES:

Okay.

(T. I 102-03) The trial judge was hardly "hassling" the witness
by properly noting that the exhibit just received spoke for
itself as to the amount of the tire repair.
Appendix Item 32 is characterized as an interjection by the
trial judge because he didn't want plaintiff's father-in-law to
testify about the fact he was hard of hearing.

The transcript

reveals that at the close of cross- examination of Mr. Pedersenf
plaintiff's father-in-law, plaintiff's counsel initially stated
he had no questions on redirect.

The trial judge excused the

witness at which point the following occurred:
MR. SYKES: I do have one other quick questions, if I might.
JUDGE CROFT:
MR. SYKES:
problem?

What is it?
Do you have a slight hearing

THE WITNESS:
MR. SYKES:

Yes.

How long have you had it?

JUDGE CROFT:

That doesn't matter.

THE WITNESS:

All my life.

JUDGE CROFT:

Just a moment.

MR. SYKES:
(T. D311-12)

That's all I have, Your Honor.

Notwithstanding the statement of plaintiff's
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counsel that he had one other question, he attempted to ask
several which were clearly beyond the scope of cross-examination.
The trial judge was attempting to control questions and answers;
even so, the question was asked and answered.
Appendix Item No. 33 is characterized by plaintiff as an
interruption by the trial judge to have evidence admitted before
plaintiff's counsel had finished laying the foundation therefor.
A review of the transcript (T. D476-77) reflects that plaintiff
was seeking the admission of three anatomical drawings (Exhibits
91, 92 and 93); the three exhibits were within the view of the
jury as Dr. Goka was asked to explain their relevance.

The trial

court properly suggested to counsel that the three exhibits be
placed into evidence so they could be considered by the jury.
All three exhibits were received without objection by defendants.
(T. D477)
Exhibit Item 35 is characterized by plaintiff as an unnecessary "scolding" of counsel on an evidentiary matter.

The tran-

script reveals that plaintiff's counsel asked a number of foundational questions with regard to certain medical reports.
D455-56)

(T.

After having the witness identify the various reports

but before having them admitted into evidence, plaintiff's
counsel asked the witness the results of those tests.
point, the following interchange occurred:
JUDGE CROFT: Well, let's get the tests into
evidence first, Mr. Sykes.
MR. SYKES:
Honor.
JUDGE CROFT:

I'd be happy to do that, Your
Well lets do it first.

T3

That's

At that

the proper way to do them. Can you identify
those four reports by exhibit numbers?
(T. D456-57)

Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel had the various

reports marked and identified, all of which were received without
objection.

It is clearly evident that the trial judge was not

"scolding" counsel, but was properly requiring him to follow
appropriate procedures prior to questioning the witness concerning
the contents of the exhibits.
DEMEANOR OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
Plaintiff contends he was prejudiced by reason of the nonverbal conduct, including facial expressions, tone of voice,
sighs and body language.

Plaintiff has moved this court to

supplement the record with four affidavits in support of this
contention.

Defendants have filed herein their response to that

motion opposing the inclusion of these affidavits as part of the
record.

A copy of Defendant's response is annexed to this brief

as Appendix C, and the contents thereof are incorporated herein.
Plaintiff made no objection during the course of the trial
to any non-verbal conduct of the trial judge; this claim was
raised by plaintiff for the first time in his motion for a new
trial.

As was noted in the various authorities cited by defendants

in their objection to the affidavits, an allegation of impropriety
is not timely raised if it is first presented as a post-trial
motion.

State v. Barron, 465 S.W.2d 523 at 528 (Mo. 1971); Annau

v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704, 535 P.2d 1095 at 1101 (1975).

In

Barron, supra, the defendant in a criminal trial asserted in his
motion for new trial that during the course of alibi testimony,
the trial judge "placed his hands flat to the side of his head,
1A

shook his head negatively once, leaned back and swiveled his
chair 180° around."

Noting that such conduct was not revealed by

the record and that there was no other evidence of its occurrence
save the verified motion for a new trial, the Supreme Court of
Missouri stated:
However, in any event, at the time appellant
asserts this incident occurred, no objection
was made and no relief was requested. The
alleged action of the trial judge, if it
occurred, would have the same effect as a
remark or comment by the trial judge, and the
rule is concisely stated in State v. McCullough,
411 S.W.2d. 79, 81 as follows:
If a party believes the remarks [by the
court] may prejudice his cause, he
should object immediately and afford the
court an opportunity to correct any
erroneous impression, and the issue is
not timely presented when raised for the
first time in a motion for a new trial.
An accused in a criminal case cannot
remain silent under the circumstances
which appellant asserts here occurred,
and thereby gamble on a favorable
verdict by permitting the trial to go to
conclusion without objection, and then
contend for the first time in a motion
for a new trial that reversible error
occurred, [citing cases.]
465 S.W.2d 523 at 528.
This same rule was followed by the Supreme Court of Washington in Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 93 Wash. 2d 127,
606 P.2d 1214 (1980).

In that case, the defendant complained of

"body language" by the trial court indicating disbelief during
the testimony of a number of defendant's witnesses.

Although the

Washington court's statement in this regard appears in plaintiff's
brief at page 30, plaintiff's editing removes the import of that
statement as it relates to objections to the alleged misconduct.
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The court's statement in full is as follows:
While the report of proceedings does not
reflect contemporaneous objections to such
conduct, concurrent objection is not required.
Seattle v. Harclaon, 56 Wash, 2d 596, 598,
354 P.2d 928 (1960), concurring opinion of
Finley J. Understandably, counsel may be
reluctant to note such an objection, particularly in the presence of the jury, and may
elect not to object at all if the incidents
are only occasional and minor. If, however,
the occurrences are as frequent and marked as
Crystal Mountain contends, counsel should
object to the court's conduct. Failure to
object denies the trial court an opportunity
to mitigate the effect of its conduct on the
jury, when such conduct has been inadvertent.
Manifest error affecting a constitutional
right may, of course, be raised at any time.
RAP 2.5(a)(3). Timeliness of objection is
not an issue in this case because the trial
court was sufficiently apprised of the matter
in the motion for mistrial. [The motion for
new trial was made approximately one-half way
through the trial].
606 P.2d at 1223 [emphasis added].
In this regard, plaintiff notes at page 28 through 30 of his
brief an incident regarding the exhibit notebooks.

As has been

noted elsewhere in defendants' brief, the trial judge's statements
were made to control the use of the exhibit book v/hich had some
potential for abuse.

In any event, when the dissatisfaction of

plaintiff's counsel with the statement was called to the trial
judge's attention, the trial judge modified his earlier ruling
with regard to the use of the notebooks.

Thus, in the single

instance of which there is any indication that plaintiff's
counsel objected to what he considered inappropriate conduct by
the trial court, the trial judge immediately took steps to
rectify any harm he may have done.
Neither before nor after the off-the-record conference which

occurred at the end of the third day of trial, did plaintiff's
counsel make any objections to comments, either verbal or nonverbal, by the trial judge.
There is nothing in the record before this court which
identifies any specific instances of non-verbal conduct or which
specifically describes the conduct or which relates the conduct
to any event in the written record.

If such conduct was perceived,

plaintiff's counsel should have interposed a timely objection
thereto so that any perceived problem could be rectified and an
appropriate record made.

Instead, plaintiff first raised com-

plaints concerning the trial judge's conduct in a motion for a
new trial.
ARGUMENTS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY
Plaintiff contends that the court permitted arguments in
front of the jury with regard to the admissibility of evidence;
plaintiff contends that permitting such argument amounted to a
comment on the evidence because it indicated the court believed
the plaintiff's evidence to be weak or unconvincing.
Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, objections to evidence
and arguments thereon almost always occur in the presence of the
jury unless the argument, of necessity, would reveal the evidence
sought to be excluded.

Certainly, the jury cannot be inconven-

ienced by being asked to leave the courtroom each time an objection
is made.

Additionally, frequent and lengthy side-bar conferences

leave the members of the jury with the feeling they are being
excluded from the proceedings and that matters are being hidden
from them.
Defendants acknowledge that in certain instances arguments
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with regard to the admissibility of the evidence did occur in the
presence of the jury.

Plaintiff asserts that during the course

of such argument defendants' counsel "frequently interjected
prejudicial information"; however, plaintiff does not specify
what this alleged prejudicial information was.
Plaintiff's brief cites five instances regarding argument
over the use of learned treatises.

In two of the instances (T.

E560-64 and H20-23) the trial court properly precluded plaintiff's
witnesses from reading portions of a learned treatise in the
course of redirect examination because the witness had not relied
upon the learned treaties in direct examination and it had not
been called to the attention of the witness during crossexamination.

In the other three instances (T. F842, M32-36 and

M49-54) plaintiff's counsel attempted to have portions of a
learned treatise read to the jury without proper foundational
questions.

After such foundational questions were asked, the

witnesses were allowed to read extensively from the learned
treatises.
Thus, in three of the five instances regarding learned
treatises cited by plaintiff, the court permitted statements from
learned treatises to be read to the jury.

Defendants believe

that this use of learned treatises was improper; if there was any
prejudice engendered by the argument over the learned treatises,
the prejudice was against defendants and not plaintiff.
With regard to arguments on the admissibility of exhibits,
plaintiff cites three instances.
of Exhibit 112

Objection to the admissibility

was made by defendants; the objection was overruled

and the video film was shown.

(T. E498-99)
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Exhibit 11, was a

photo album of plaintiff's life in Nigeria prior to the time he
came to the United States. (T. G137)

Defendants simply objected

on the grounds of relevancy; plaintiff's counsel explained the
types of pictures that were in the photograph album; the trial
court reviewed the album and sustained the objection without
lengthy argument.
bills (T. J140-42)

With regard to the admissibility of medical
plaintiff sought to have his wife testify as

to the medical bills incurred by plaintiff since the accident.
The trial judge asked plaintiff to give copies of all of the
bills to defendants1 counsel; defendants1 counsel stated that
after review of the bills he would likely stipulate to the
reasonableness of the bills, although not that they were incurred
as a result of the accident.

(T. M142)

The transcript reflects

that there was no argument at all, simply an interchange between
the court and counsel.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court allowed oral argumentation over other important evidentiary points.

Plaintiff cites

as an example a disability evaluation by Dr. Gummow (T. F856-57)
In those two pages of transcript, the only statements made by
defendants1 counsel are as follows:
MR. STEGALL:
I think I am going to object
to that as without foundation as to her
expertise with regard to making any sort of
vocational loss of income projections, Your
Honor.
(T. F856), and:
MR. STEGALL:
Then I would object to it as
essentially relying on hearsay testimony that
we don't have before the jury, that she is
going outside of her area of expertise with
regard to inquiring as to that type of income
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information, description of occupation and
the like.
(T. F857).

A review of other examples cited by plaintiff also

reveal that defendants' counsel made a simple statement of his
objection to the testimony.
In many of the specific examples cited by plaintiff in his
brief, the evidence in question was admitted.

In the remaining

examples, a review of the specific portions of the transcript
reveals that little argumentation occurred and specific objections
were made to the evidence in question.

In fact, the portions of

the transcript cited support the contention that any prejudice
was to defendants and not to plaintiff.
Additionally, the trial court issued the following specific
instructions to the jury with regard to evidentiary rulings and
statements by counsel.
At times throughout the trial the court may
have been called upon to rule whether or not
certain offered evidence might be admitted.
Whether offered evidence is admissible is
purely a question of law. Neither the weight
of the evidence, nor the credibility of the
witness is involved in such rulings. You are
not to consider nor conjecture upon evidence
offered but not admitted, nor any evidence
stricken out by the court.
(R. 618) and,
Statements of counsel made throughout the
trial, are not evidence and should not be
considered as such by you.
(R. 620)
There is no support in the record or transcript for plaintiff's contention that the court's permitting evidentiary objections to be made and argued in the presence of the jury somehow
constituted a comment by the trial court on the evidence.
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As has

been shown, the trial court's rulings on those objections were as
frequently in plaintiff's favor as against him.

The trial court

fully instructed the jury that neither rulings on the evidence
nor statements by counsel were to be considered as evidence by
the jury.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED
CLARK, M.D., TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL.

LINCOLN

APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW
Rule 26(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The party is under a duty seasonably to
supplement his response with respect to any
question directly addressed to . . . the
identity of each person expected to be called
as an expert witness at trial, the subject
matter on which he is expected to testify,
and the substance of his testimony.
Rule 51(a)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows the trial
court to grant a new trial based on "accident or surprise, which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."
The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether or
not to exclude testimony or to grant a new trial based on an
alleged surprise witness.

Zakroff v. May, 8 Ariz. App. 101, 443

P.2d 916 (1968); Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977) (a
ruling on a motion for a new trial will be overturned only for a
clear abuse of discretion); Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah
1981) (trial court's ruling on motion for new trial overturned
only for clear abuse of discretion); Hadid v. Alexander, 55 Md.
App. 344, 462 A.2d 1216 (1983) (trial judge has "large measure of
discretion in applying sanctions for failure to comply");
Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 2 Conn. App. 103, 476 A.2d
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1074 (1984) (decision to exclude testimony "rests within the
sound discretion of the court"); Havas v. Haupt, 94 Nev. 1091,
583 P.2d 1094 (1978) (decision to grant new trial lies within
sound discretion of court).

In reviewing a trial court's use of

such discretion, the Utah Supreme Court noted that, "to overturn
a trial court's ruling on a new trial requires a "clear transgression of 'reasonable bounds of discretion'", and no such transgression exists where there is evidence to support the ruling.
Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d at 202.

See also, Sturdivant v. Yale-New

Haven Hospital, 476 A.2d at 1077.
Beyond showing an abuse of discretion, the appellant must
establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged "surprise" before
the denial of a new trial will be overturned.
P.2d 197.

See, Lembach, 639

See also, Acosta v. Superior Court, 146 Ariz. 437, 706

P.2d 763 (1985); and Preston Motor Co., Inc. v. De S. Palomares,
133 Ariz. 245, 650 P.2d 127 (1982).
The policy behind such rules are that the disclosure of the
witnesses permits "the opposing party to prepare an effective
cross-examination."

Hoover v. United States Dept. of the Interior,

611 F.2d 1132, 1142 (5th Cir. 1980).

See also, Sturdivant, 476

A.2d 1074; and DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433 F.
Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1977) . Where this policy is not contravened, a
so-called "surprise" witness has been allowed to testify.

See,

Havas, 583 P.2d 1094, ("surprise" was not found to exist where
appellants could have taken action after notification to protect
their interests); Zakroff v. May, 8 Ariz. App. 101 443 P.2d 916
(1968) (testimony allowed where appellant was given opportunity
to depose witness prior to testimony).
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See also, Macshara v.

Garfield, 20 Utah 2d 152, 434 P.2d 756 (1967), rev'd on other
grounds, Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.3d 1328 (Utah 1979) (not
abuse to permit testimony not disclosed at pretrial.)
Where appellant opposes the testimony of a witness, he must
object when the witness is called to testify.

lf

[W]e hold that,

under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, a specific objection
is required even where a pretrial motion is suppress has been
made."

State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983).
ARGUMENT

Plaintiff contends that Lincoln Clark, M.D., a psychiatrist
called to testify on behalf of defendants, was a surprise witness
whose testimony was prejudicial to plaintiff.
Conduct by plaintiff himself which was perceived by an
experienced psychiatrist as threatening caused Dr. Clark to
initially withdraw as an expert witness.

Plaintiff's own counsel

apparently perceived the threat as real as he called Dr. Clark to
warn him of possible violence from plaintiff in an incident where
plaintiff, in fact, appeared at the office of plaintiff's counsel
and banged on counsel's desk with a cane.

After reassessing the

risk to his personal safety, Dr. Clark concluded that he could
appear as a witness.

Plaintiff was informed that Dr. Clark would

be a witness more than ten days prior to trial.

Dr. Clark's

testimony did not occur until February 13, 1987, twenty-two days
after plaintiff's counsel had notice that he would appear.
Plaintiff's motion in. limine to exclude Dr. Clark as a
witness was heard by the trial judge on the Friday before trial,
January 30, 1987.

At that time, Judge Croft indicated that he

was inclined to permit Dr. Clark to testify and stated:
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[JUDGE CROFT]: I would say that if, during
the course of the trial, you decide you want
to call Dr. Clark then perhaps an opportunity
for Mr. Sykes to interview him might be
granted.
MR. STEGALL: Okay. I would certainly be
willing to inquire of Dr. Clark as to whether
he could put together a written report prior
to Monday or Tuesday. I don't know how
feasible that is but I will certainly so
inquire and if one can be prepared —
JUDGE CROFT: One might say if he is going to
testify then tell him we want a written
report for the attorneys to have a look at.
MR. SYKES: That's the least we should have,
is a written report.
JUDGE CROFT: So if you want to agree to try
to get together to dictate a report and have
it available to you Monday or Tuesday so you
will both have it then I would say if you
went to call him, why, I would permit him to
do so.
(T. Q49-50.)
A copy of Dr. Clark's written report relating to his examination and evaluation of plaintiff was delivered to plaintiff's
counsel on Wednesday, February 4, 1987, at 9:30 a.m.

Plaintiff's

counsel did not thereafter attempt to depose or interview Dr.
Clark.

No objection was made by plaintiff when Dr. Clark was

called to testify on February 13, 1987.
At trial, plaintiff's counsel conducted an able, aggressive
and lengthy cross-examination of Dr. Clark.

A review of the

transcript (Vol. L) reveals the cross-examination fills nearly
one hundred pages (compared to 44 pages for direct examination)
and occupied substantially all of the afternoon session of
February 13, 1987.

During the course of cross-examination,

plaintiff's counsel tested the credibility of the witness utilizing
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Dr. Clark's transcribed testimony taken during the trial of
another closed-head brain injury case in which both plaintiff's
counsel and Dr. Clark were involved.
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the refusal of the trial
court to exclude Dr. Clark as a witness.

The witness's earlier

withdrawal had been caused by plaintiff's own conduct.

A seven

page single-spaced typed report of the witness' examination and
findings were furnished to plaintiff's counsel substantially in
advance of the witness's testimony.

Plaintiff's counsel had had

the opportunity to test the demeanor, credentials and expertise
of the witness in a prior legal proceeding.

A cross-examination

performed by plaintiff's counsel reveals counsel's own substantial
expertise in the field of brain injury which permitted him to
make a full and informative cross-examination of the witness.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING
EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE ADMITTED BY PLAINTIFF,
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that error may
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected.
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, defines relevant evidence
as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that "[a]11
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relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided . .
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that evidence,
although relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Rule 803(18), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that learned
treatises are not excluded by the hearsay rule; learned treatises
may be used as follows:
To the extent called to the attention of an
expert witness upon cross-examination or
relied upon by him in direct examination,
statements contained in published treatises,
periodicals, or pamphlet on the subject of
history of a medicine, or other science or
art, established as a reliable authority by
the testimony or admission of the witness or
by other expert testimony or by judicial
notice. If admitted, the statements may be
read into evidence but may not be received as
exhibits.
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that testimony in
the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided
by the trier-of-fact.
A judgment will not be reversed for alleged error in the
exclusion of evidence unless it appears in the record that the
error was prejudicial.

Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney

Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978).

Where evidence is excluded by

the trial court, any error which may have resulted from such
exclusion is cured where the substance of the evidence is later
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admitted through some other means.
586 (Utah 1983).

State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d

Even if a refusal to admit photographs was

error, no prejudice resulted to defendant where the evidence was
cumulative and could have added nothing to defendant's case.
Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984).
ARGUMENT
EXHIBIT 114—VIDEO TAPE OF CRASH
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in refusing to
admit a video tape of a crash sequence in which an automobile is
driven into a wall at five, twenty-one and twenty-three miles per
hour with the video tape showing the effects on dummys in the car
including the dummy striking its head on the windshield.

The

video tape was reviewed by the court and counsel out of the
presence of the jury.

Defendants objected to the admission of

the video tape upon the ground that the mechanism of the crash
shown in the tape, a head-on striking of a fixed wall by an
automobile, was substantially different than the mechanism
involved in the accident in question.

(T. C123-28)

There was no

evidence of any broken windshield on plaintiff's vehicle, and no
evidence that the plaintiff struck his head on the windshield.
The video tape was not specially made for this particular litigation to illustrate the particular circumstances involved in
plaintiff's accident.

In view of the substantial difference

between the mechanism of the accident in question and the head-on
wall collision portrayed in the video tape and the lack of
evidence of plaintiff striking the windshield, admission of the
evidence would have substantially prejudiced the defendants.
Plaintiff was permitted to testify that he did strike his
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head on the interior of the vehicle.

Testimony was elicited from

various treating physicians as to statements made by plaintiff to
the physician regarding whether or not he hit his head on the
interior of the vehicle and what was hit.

Plaintiff's expert

witness testified with regard to the effect of a sudden deceleration on the occupants of a motor vehicle.

Thus, substantial

evidence was admitted with regard to plaintiff's claim that he
struck his head on the interior of the vehicle.
While the video tape did illustrate the effects of deceleration on occupants of a vehicle, it did so in such a graphic form
and under circumstances substantially different than those
involved in the case at trial that the trial court properly
refused to admit the evidence even for illustrative purposes.
LEARNED TREATISES
Plaintiff cites as error a refusal or reluctance of the
trial court to permit the use of learned treatises during examination.

While claiming "numerous occasions" plaintiff cites

specifically only four instances.
The example described by plaintiff as the "most egregious"
occurred during rebuttal testimony by Dr. Linda Gummow.

The

transcript reflects that plaintiff's counsel initially attempted
to have Dr. Gummow read from the learned treatises without any
testimony that those treatises had been relied upon by her as
part of her direct testimony.

The transcript also reveals that

the witness was being asked to read from the literature prior to
authenticating it.

Following objection by defendants, the trial

court properly required that the witness first authenticate the
treatises, then state that she had an opinion with regard to the
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subject matter of those treatises and that she relied upon the
treatises in formulating that opinion and then render her opinion
before permitting her to read from the treatises. Thus, the "most
egregious" example of the trial court's reluctance to admit
statements contained in learned treatises was no more than the
trial court properly requiring that appropriate foundational
testimony be given before the statements were read to the jury.
It should be further noted that Dr. Gummow read to the jury
statements occupying most of ten pages of trial transcript.

(T.

M36-46)
In the two specific examples cited by plaintiff with regard
to the examination of Dr. Gerald Moress, (T. D444-45 and D452-53)
plaintiff's witness was asked on redirect examination to authenticate a learned treatise. In these instances, the witness had
not relied upon the learned treatise in direct examination and
was not cross examined upon it; apparently, plaintiff's counsel
was intending to have the witness authenticate the text in
anticipation of its use with other witnesses.

Plaintiff's

counsel did not attempt to authenticate the treatise during the
course of direct testimony but waited until redirect examination
to do so.

The treatise in question was subsequently authenticated

by another witness, Dr. Goka.

(T. D475)

In the third specific instance cited by plaintiff's counsel
again attempted an inappropriate use of the learned treatise
exception.

In earlier testimony, Dr. Gummow testified that a

treatise by Jeannette and Teasdale was a learned text in the
field.

A review of the transcript (T. D842-43) reveals that

again plaintiff's counsel was attempting to have the witness read
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from a learned treatise without foundational testimony that the
treatise was relied upon by the expert in the giving of her
direct testimony.

Instead, plaintiff's counsel simply asked

whether the learned treatise agreed with her and then asked her
to read from the learned treatise.

In fact, the testimony never

did meet the foundational requirements for admissabilityf but the
witness was still allowed to read from the treatise.
EXCLUSION OF REBUTTAL WITNESSES
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in excluding the
testimony of two individuals, Dr. Joseph Johnson and Dr. Devra
Garfinkle, both mathmatics instructors at the University of Utah
who had plaintiff in their classes.

After Dr. Johnson was

identified, defendants' counsel objected to the witnesses as
being improper on rebuttal.

The trial judge requested a sidebar

conference with counsel and then excused the jury.

After the

jury was excused, plaintiff's counsel made a proffer with regard
to the two witnesses.

The proffer was testimony from the two

witnesses as to the grades plaintiff had received in their
classes, their observations regarding plaintiff's ability to
grasp mathmatical concepts, and the fact plaintiff had importuned
them to raise his grades.

These witnesses were being offered to

rebut the testimony of Dr. Clark as to the time of the appearance
of plaintiff's problems and the opinion of Dr. Cook that plaintiff
was a malingerer.

Defendants contended that the proffered

testimony might have had some relevance to the presentation of
the case in chief but that it was not proper rebuttal testimony.
(T. M97-102)

After hearing the proffered testimony, the trial

judge determined that it was not truly rebuttal in nature and
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that it should have been produced in plaintiff's case in chief,
(T. M101-102)

Additionally, the testimony was cumulative of

substantial other testimony regarding the time of the appearance
of plaintiff's claimed problems.
EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S PLANS FOR THE FUTURE
Plaintiff contends that it was error for the trial court not
to allow plaintiff's wife, Elizabeth Onyeabor, to testify with
regard to their plans for the future if there had been no accident.
Defendants objected to the question upon the grounds that it
called for speculation and that plaintiff was the proper person
of which to ask the question.

The objection was sustained (T.

J142-43) Subsequently, Mr. Onyeabor was recalled to testify as to
his future plans.

The court permited testimony with regard to

plaintiff's future plans for work and school; the court sustained
defendants' various objections to questions as to what plaintiff
believed his earnings might have been but for the accident.

The

court did permit plaintiff to testify as to the types of jobs he
had intended to obtain during the two years following the accident
and his various school plans.

(T. M3-7)

OPINION ON FAULT
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in refusing to
permit Deputy Leavitt to render an opinion as to who was "at
fault" in causing the accident.

The transcript reveals plaintiff's

counsel first asked the witness as to his familiarity with the
traffic rules and regulations in force in the county and state
and whether it was his job to enforce those rules and regulation;
the witness was then asked "what is the proper thing to do in a
situation where an individual is positioned such as Mrs. Bates."
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Defendants objected to the question within the context of the
witness1 duty to enforcement of traffic regulations as an attempt
to admit into a civil proceeding evidence of a traffic violation.
The objection was sustained on the basis that the question was
improper,

(T. A47-48)

Plaintiff's counsel then asked the

witness "tell us what you believed to have happened from that
moment [Bates exiting driveway] forward."

Deputy Leavitt testified

as follows:
Well, I believe that as she started to exit
the parking lot that she saw a large van or
truck-type vehicle but that she could not see
any other vehicles that could have been to
the side of that vehicle and as she pulled
out pulled out in front of the van and
attempted to move all the way across the
roadway into the left-turn lane she didn't
see the vehicle that collided with her,
(T. A48-50)

After the jury was excused for the evening, plain-

tiff's counsel made a proffer with regard to allowing Deputy
Leavitt to testify as to who was "at fault". (T. A59-62)

The

trial judge sustained defendants' objection to the proffer
stating that the officer had already testified as to the cause of
the accident including the conduct of defendant Bates which
resulted in the collision.

(T. A61-62)

Obviously, the concern

of the trial judge was with the form of the question and the use
of the term "at fault".

The officer was permitted to respond to

the substance of the question.

Additionally, the next day on

direct examination, Deputy Leavitt was permitted to testify as to
the "cause" of the accident.

(T. C69)

Clearly, the substance of

the testimony sought to be admitted by plaintiff was admitted.
EXHIBIT 7 5-A PURCHASE ORDER
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in refusing to
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admit exhibit 75, a purchase order purportedly issued by Chuk's
Group of Companies to Gillis Continental Enterprises dated March
21, 1981. It was offered "as illustrative of a contract that he
had of some substance in Nigeria of his business."

(T. G152)

Defendant's objection to the admission of the exhibit on grounds
of irrelevance was sustained.
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the refusal to admit the
purchase order as substantial evidence was given by plaintiff, by
plaintiff's sister and by plaintiff's acquaintances regarding
plaintiff's business in Nigeria and his income therefrom.

A

purchase order for surface materials to be delivered in 1981,
without more, would not add anything to evidence which was
received by the court.

For this reason, the evidence was properly

excluded as irrelevant under Rule 410, Utah Rules of Evidence, or
as a needless presentation of cumulative evidence under Rule 403.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
WITH: REGARD TO THE DUTIES OF' BOTH PLAINTIFF
AND DEFENDANT AS DRIVERS OF MOTOR VEHICLES;
THE ISSUE OF THE NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY', OF EACH
PARTY WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW
In Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), the trial
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment in an
action involving a tenant's claim for personal injuries allegedly
resulting from the negligence of the landlord and the builder of
the apartment building.

From the granting of the motion for

summary judgment, plaintiff appealed.

In reversing the trial

court the Supreme Court stated that "summary judgment should be
granted with great caution in negligence cases."
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Ld. at 725.

The reasoning of the court was stated as follows:
In the days when contributory negligence was
an absolute defense in a negligence actionr
summary judgment could be used to dispose of
negligence actions without depriving a
plaintiff of his right to a trial on the
merits. Now, however, contributory negligence
is not an absolute defense, and summary
judgment is rarely an appropriate remedy for
resolving negligence actions.
Id. at 728.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46(1) (1953), provides:
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent under
the conditions and having regard to the
actual and potential hazards then existing.
Consistent with the foregoing, every person
shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed
when approaching and crossing an intersection
or railroad grade crossing, when approaching
or going around a curve, when approaching a
hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or
winding roadway, and when special hazards
exist with respect to pedestrians or other
traffic or by reason of whether or highway
conditions.
Lodder v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 259 P.2d 589 (Utah
1953), was an action for personal injuries arising out of a
collision between a train and an automobile in which plaintiff
was riding as a passenger.

Defendants argued on appeal that

under the evidence and as a matter of law the sole proximate
cause of the collision was the negligence of the automobile
driver.

Defendants claimed that the driver violated § 41-6-46(1)

by driving at a speed greater than was "reasonable and prudent
under the conditions having regard to actual or potential hazards
then existing."

In refusing to overrule the jury's finding that

defendant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the
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collision, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
That there are cases where such a holding is
proper is clear, the statute does not fix any
definite speed at which a driver may drive.
It merely requires that the speed be reasonable and prudent and appropriate under the
existing conditions and surrounding circumstances. The test which it provides is very
similar to the common law test of negligence.
What rate of speed constitutes negligence or
violation of this statute under the conditions shown by the evidence is a matter about
which there is room for reasonable disagreement; such being the case, a jury question is
presented. . . . Under the circumstances here
shown, a finding that the driver was free
from negligence was not unreasonable; a jury
question was therefore presented and we
cannot overrule the jury's conclusion.
Id. at 592-93 [emphasis added].
ARGUMENT
Although plaintiff's stated contention is that the trial
court gave erroneous jury instructions, it is obvious from
plaintiff's argument that plaintiff contends the trial court
should have directed a verdict on the liability issue.
Motions for summary judgment and for directed verdict in
favor of a party at the close of evidence in a jury trial are
substantially the same.

Both require the trial court to say that

there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried by the
jury and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.

The same cautions expressed by the Utah Supreme Court in

Williams v. Melby, supra, with regard to a summary judgment are
applicable to a directed verdict.
As appears from the Statement of Facts and the record, there
was substantial conflict in the evidence as to the circumstances
of the accident, including the location and speed of the two
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vehicles prior to impact, the location, speed and actions of the
white van or truck next to plaintiff's vehicle, and the location
of the vehicles after impact.

It would have been improper for

the trial court to have substituted its judgment for that of the
jury in resolving the conflicting evidence with regard to the
facts and circumstances of the accident.
The road on which plaintiff was traveling was busy and
heavily traveled with several shopping centers and a school
nearby.

Plaintiff was approaching the semaphore controlled

intersection at Fort Union Boulevard.

Two driveways from a

shopping center parking lot were in the immediate vicinity of the
intersection.

A large van or truck was traveling beside or

slightly ahead of plaintiff which obscured his vision to the
right front and right.

There was other traffic behind him and

oncoming traffic south-bound on 900 East.

Plaintiff was travel-

ing from a construction site at 8000 South and 100 East to his
home at approximately 900 East and 4400 South for lunch during
his lunch hour; it may be inferred that plaintiff was in a hurry.
Under these circumstances, the jury could appropriately
determine a reasonable person would have slowed his vehicle in
anticipation of actual or potential hazards.

The law imposed

upon plaintiff certain duties with regard to the operation of his
vehicle; those duties are accurately set forth in the court's
Instruction 21:
To use reasonable care to keep a lookout for
other vehicles, persons, or other conditions
reasonably to be anticipated, and the duty to
keep a lookout includes the duty to see and
heed that which is plain to be seen.
To drive at such a speed as was safe, reason56

able and prudent under the conditions and
circumstances having due regard for the
width, surface and condition of the highway,
the flow of other traffic thereon, then
existing. Consistent therewith, our law
provides that every person shall drive at a
safe and appropriate speed when approaching
an intersection, and when special hazards
exist with respect to other traffic, or by
reason of highway conditions.
(R. 640)
Given the conflict within the evidence presented to the jury
and the duties imposed upon the operators of motor vehicles, the
issue of the negligence of the parties and the apportionment of
such negligence between the parties required that the issue be
submitted to the jury.
In its special verdict, the jury clearly considered defendant
Bates to have been the substantial contributor in causing the
accident and attributed seventy-five percent of the fault to her.
However, the jury also determined that plaintiff failed to see
and heed an actual or potential hazard or operated his vehicle at
a speed which was not safe, reasonable and prudent under the
conditions and circumstances and attributed twenty-five percent
of the fault to him.
The trial court issued a proper instruction on the concept
of proximate cause in Instruction 16 (R. 633). The jury found
plaintiff's negligence to have been a proximate cause of the
accident and his injuries. (R. 659).
It should be noted that the trial court also included
in its charge to the jury an instruction that the mere occurrence
of an accident does not support an inference of negligence (R.
628) and a "sudden peril" instruction (R. 632). Both of these
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instructions were consistent with plaintiff's arguments on
liability,
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, AN ADDITUR.
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW
The trial judge, in granting or denying a motion for new
trial, has broad latitude.

The disposition will not be over-

turned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial
judge.

Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah

1984); Goodard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984).

Rulings on

motions for new trial are addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court.

Orders granting or denying motions for a new

trial will not be reversed on appeal unless there has been a
manifest abuse of discretion.

Schmit v. Intermountain Health

Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981), (citing Smith v. Shreeve,
551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976); Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 619 (Utah
1976); Pollesche v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 497 P.2d 236
(1972) .
In Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982), the Utah
Supreme Court specifically addressed its standard of review of
motions for new trial.

In an action for personal injuries

arising out of a motor vehicle accident the trial court denied
defendant's motion for new trial upon the condition that the
plaintiff accept a remittitur in the amount of $15,000.
parties appealed.

Both

With regard to the Supreme Court's review of

motions for new trial, the court stated:
Under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of
CO

Civil Procedure, a trial court may grant a
new trial on the ground of "[i]nsufficiency
of the evidence to justify the verdict . . .."
The trial judge has broad latitude in
granting or denying a motion for new trial,
and will not be overturned on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion. But when the issue
is alleged insufficiency of evidence, the
decisions of this Court have established a
different standard for our review of the
trial court's decisions on motions for new
trial, depending on whether the court has
denied the motion or granted it.
When the trial court has denied the motion
for new trial, its decision will be sustained
on appeal if there was "an evidentiary basis
for the jury's decision . . .." The trial
court's denial of a motion for new trial will
be reversed only if "the evidence to support
the verdict is completely lacking or was so
slight and unconvincing as to make the
verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust."
[Citing cases.]
657 P.2d at 731-32.
ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFF'S BACK INJURY
As appears from defendant's Statement of Facts relating to
damages, the evidence was in dispute with regard to the nature
and extent of plaintiff's claimed back injury and the cause of
that injury.
In its Interrogatory 6, the jury made the following findings
with regard to the damages proximately resulting from the collision
in question:
1. General Damages (pain and
suffering, past and future.)
2.

5.

$ 4,000.00

Special Damages
a. Medical expenses to date
b. Lost earnings to date

$ 1,850.00
$ 4,500.00

Present Value of Future
Special Damages:
a. Medical and psychotherapy

$ 5,000.00
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b.

Lost future earnings

Total Damages

$ 1,500.00
$16,850.00

(R. 663.)
It would appear from the damages awarded that the jury
believed plaintiff had suffered some back injury.

However, the

jury could certainly have determined from the testimony of Dr.
Spencer and Dr. Houts and from the CT scans and the evidence
regarding plaintiff's physical activities that plaintiff's
complaints resulted from a pre-existing bulging disc which was
aggravated by the automobile accident but which had resolved
itself by September 20, 1984.

The jury also could have concluded

that many of the subsequent problems with plaintiff's back
resulted from a reinjury during a karate class.

This is particu-

larly so in view of the letter written by Dr. Houts to Farmer's
Insurance Group (plaintiff's insurance carrier) (Exh. 136) in
which Dr. Houts stated, "The patient now tells me that three
months ago in karate class he was doing jumps and kicks when he
suddenly hurt his back again."

Plaintiff was angry at Dr. Houts

concerning that letter and came to the doctor's office so loud
and angry that he was asked to leave.

(T. G17; Exh. 32.)

For

this reason, the jury's damage award to the extent it related to
the back injury was justified by the evidence and cannot be
considered to have resulted from passion or prejudice.
Defendants' counsel takes exception to the suggestion by
plaintiff in his brief that this Court should take judicial
notice of the settlement value of generic herniated disc cases.
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSED-HEAD BRAIN INJURY
Plaintiff's claim of closed-head brain injury was substan60

tially disputed by the evidence.

Essentially, plaintiff claimed

that in the collision his automobile was thrown onto and off of
the median causing him to strike his head on the interior of the
vehicle.
On direct examination Lincoln Clark, M.D., testified as to
the best predictors of a closed-head brain injury:
A

The greatest amount of data on this, and
the features that are the brightest
value in predicting what the likely
consequences are going to be, is first
of all the evidence that there was a
significant blow delivered to the head.
Number two, the loss of consciousness
that occurs from the injury. Number
three how much memory is lost for events
prior to the accident. And finally how
much loss of memory after the accident.
That's post-traumatic amnesia and the
first is called retrograde amnesia.

(T. L77-78.)
As appears from defendants' Statement of Facts, there was
substantial evidence that plaintiff did not suffer any blow, let
alone a significant blow, to his head.
loss of consciousness.

There was no evidence of

Plaintiff's own testimony concerning the

accident did not indicate any loss of memory for events prior to
the accident and no apparent loss of memory after the accident.
Based upon his examination of all of plaintiff's medical records
of voluminous psychological test results and his examination of
the plaintiff, Dr. Clark rendered his opinion that plaintiff had
not suffered a closed-head brain injury.

(T. L101-102)

Addition-

ally, Dr. Clark testified as to a number of factors in plaintiff's
life which would be expected to lead to many of the personal,
marital, school and work problems of which plaintiff complained.
(T. L103-104)

Dr. Clark also explained in some detail the
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improbability of and lack of scientific evidence to support the
notion that an individual could suffer a brain injury without a
direct blow to the head. (T. L84-87)

This theory, called axonal

shearing, (a notion similar to a whiplash injury of the brain)
had been a theory put forward by plaintifffs experts to explain
how plaintiff could have suffered an injury to his brain without
any direct blow to it.
Certainly, plaintiff had numerous expert witnesses testify
that in their opinion plaintiff had suffered a closed-head brain
injury.

The so-called "neuropsychological" testimony was based

upon plaintiff's performance on various psychologiccil tests which
occurred after the accident; however, there was no such testing,
or similar testing, prior to the accident with which to compare
the post-accident test results.

The validity of such testing as

a method to diagnose brain injury was disputed by defense witness
Dr. Robert Cook (T. Klll-13).
There was substantial evidence from which the jury concluded
that the plaintiff did not suffer a blow to his head and did not
suffer a closed-head brain injury.

In view of the substantial

evidence supporting the jury's damage award, there is no basis to
believe that the verdict resulted from any passion or prejudice
or any claim of improper conduct by the trial judge.
Again, defendants1 counsel takes strong exception to plaintiff's improper inclusion in his brief of information concerning
costs incurred by him to try the case and take this appeal, and
of any settlement offers that may have been made to the plaintiff
prior to trial.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff received a full and fair trial of his personal
injury claims.

The verdict of the jury and the denial by the

trial court of plaintiff's motion for new trial or additur should
be affirmed.
DATED this cM

day of September, 1988.
GUSTIN, GREEN, STE£ALL & LIAPIS

William A. Stegall^
Attorneys for Re spond\nt(3
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APPENDIX C

William A. Stegall, Jr. USB# A3093
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Respondent
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 53 2-6996
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
OOoOooo
EMMANUEL N. ONYEABOR,
Appellant,
vs.
PRO ROOFING, INC., a Utah
corporation, and PAM BATES,
Respondents.

:
: RESPONDENTS' RESPONSE TO
: APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
: SUPPLEMENT RECORD ON APPEAL
:
: Case No. 87-0265-CA
:
:
:
oooOooo

Respondents Pro Roofing and Pam Bates respond to the
appellant's motion to supplement record on appeal as follows:
AFFIDAVITS REGARDING "NON-VERBAL CONDUCT"
Appellant seeks to include in the record before this
court affidavits of four individuals which affidavits purport to
describe the conduct of the trial judge, the Honorable Bryant H.
Croft, during the course of trial.

The affidavits are given by

Brian Burns and Linda Gummow, individuals who treated appellant
and testified on his behalf at trial, Robert Jinks, a law clerk
employed by appellant's attorney, and Kay Nebeker, appellant's
guardian ad litem.
It would be improper for this Cour*- to permit appellant

to include these affidavits in the record on appeal for the
following reasons:
1.

The non-verbal conduct complained of by

appellant was not the subject of objection during the course
of trial.
(a). An allegation of impropriety is not timely
raised if it is first presented at a post-trial motion.
State v. Barron, 465 S.W.2d 523 at 528 (Mo. 1971);
Annau v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704, 535 P.2d 1095 at 1101
(1975) .
(b). Regardless of whether it is made contemporaneously or not, an objection to court impropriety
should be raised during trial to allow the court to
correct any inadvertent impressions given.

Id.;

Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 93 Wash.2d 127,
606 P.2d 1214 at 1223 (1980); Butler v. United States,
188 F.2d 24 at 27 (D.C. Cir 1951).
(c). Objection to impropriety is necessary to
preserve an accurate record of the complained of
conduct for review.

Butler, 188 F.2d 24 at 27; see

also, People v. Maes, 607 P.2d 1028 at 1032 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1980) .
2.

The proffered affidavits are not part of the

official record.

2

(a)

Appellate review must be based upon the

record before the trial court.

Reliable Furniture Co.

v. Fidelity and Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, 14 Utah 2d
169, 380 P.2d 135 (1963);

Petro v. State, 383 N.W.2d

323 at 324 (Ind. 1978); Flick v. Van Tassell, 547 P.2d
204 (Utah 1976); and Corbett v. Corbett, 24 Utah 2d
378, 472 P.2d 430 at 433
(b)

(1970).

The presumption of regularity in the proceed-

ings can only be overcome by record evidence.

State v.

Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 at 1267 (Utah 1982); and Wood v.
Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255 at 1257 (Utah 1984).
(c)

Affidavits are not effective in curing

deficiencies of the record.

City of Tucson v. Rvelas,

19 Ariz. App. 530, 508 P.2d 1174 at 1176 (1973); State
v. Hodges, 103 Idaho 765, 653 P.2d 1177 at 1178 (1982);
Linton v. Maver-Never Meat Packers, 71 N.M. 305, 378
P.2d 126 at 128 (1963); Annau.
3.

Neither these affidavits, nor similar affi-

davits, were submitted to the trial court during post-trial
motions filed by appellant and are therefore now intimely.
In Reliable Furniture Co., 380 P.2d 135, the Utah Supreme
Court refused to consider four depositions which had not
been previously presented to the trial court.
4.

The affidavits proffered by appellant are

insufficient to establish court impropriety as the affiants'

3

statements concerning the alleged misconduct are vague and
general, and they do not set forth specific examples of the
alleged improprieties.
5.

Petro v. State, 383 N.E.2d 323.

The statements contained in the affidavits

are not sufficient to be used as evidence in a judicial
proceeding as they are completely conclusory in nature, are
without proper foundation and largely express affiants'
opinions as to the alleged judicial conduct and its effect
upon members of the jury.

State v. Snyder, 88 Idaho 479,

401 P.2d 548 at 550 (1965); People v. Thompson, 43 P.2d 600
at 604 (Calif. 1935); People v. Merrill, 231 P.2d 573 at 581
(Calif. 1951); Utah Rules of Evidence 701 (1983).
6.

Additionally, the affidavits include inadmis-

sible hearsay and comment on verbal expressions by the
court. Utah Rules of Evidence 802 (1983) ; People v. Merrill,
231 P.2d 573, 581.
7.

Even assuming improper conduct on the part of

the court, any prejudice committed was alleviated by the
court's instructions to the jury that the jury alone was the
trier of fact and that any conduct by the court or counsel
during trial was to be disregarded.
8.

Regardless of the admittance of the affidavits

the appellant must prove that he was prejudiced by the
alleged judicial conduct; the mere possibility or prejudice
is not enough.

Ettus v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 233

Kan. 555, 665 P.2d 730 at 739 (1983).
4

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN COUNSEL
Appellant also seeks to supplement the record by
including three letters from respondents* counsel to appellants
counsel sent in December and January preceding the February 1987
trial.
Appellant asserts this correspondence supports his
claim that Dr. Lincoln Clark was a "surprise witness".
As is noted in appellant's memorandum, the testimony of
Dr. Clark, which was eventually given on February 13, 1987, the
tenth day of trial, was the subject of a motion _in limine by
appellant prior the commencement of trial.

The argument that Dr.

Clark was a "surprise witness" was also made by appellant in
connection with his post-trial motions.
At no time during the proceedings before the trial
court did appellant seek to introduce correspondence between
counsel as part of the record for the consideration of the trial
court.
Without conceding in any way that Dr. Clark was either
a "surprise witness" or that the correspondence in any way is
relevant to the issue, it would be improper for this Court to
consider on appeal documents which were never part of the record
or subject to the consideration of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellant's motion to
supplement the record herein with affidavits and copies of

5

correspondence between counsel should be denied.
DATED this

/^

day of July, 1988.
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS

William A. StSgfall,
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this / S ^ day of July, 1988, I
caused to be delivered, by hand, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument to:
Robert B. Sykes
M. Gale Lemmon
Attorneys at Law
311 South State Street, Suite 240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX D

!

THE PART OF MR. ONYEABOR?

2

A

PRIOR TO--

3

Q

PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT.

4

A

I NEVER SEEN SUCH BECAUSE HE IS A GUY THAT ALWAYS

5
6
7

APPRECIATE WHATEVER
Q

I DO TO HIM.

IN ALL OF THE YEARS YOU KNEW HIM IN NIGERIA —

NOW, YOU USED THE WORD PARANOID CONDUCT.

8

A

YEAH.

9

Q

PARANOID CONDUCT.

10

A

THAT'S SOMEBODY WHO JUST HAVE LOST HIS SENSES,

WHAT DOES THAT MEAN TO YOU?

11

YOU KNOW, WHO IS FIRED UP ABOUT EVERYTHING YOU DO.

YOU

12

NEVER, YOU KNOW, TAKING WHATEVER YOU DO AS SOMETHING AND

13

ALWAYS AFTER YOUR OWN, YOU KNOW, THE WAY HE FEELS ABOUT IT.

14

Q

IS IT SOMEONE WHO IS SUSPICIOUS ABOUT OTHER

15

PEOPLE?

16

A

A B O U T OTHER

17

Q

DID YOU EVER, EVER, IN NIGERIA NOTICE EMMANUEL

PEOPLE.

18

TO BE A SUSPICIOUS PERSON WHO ACCUSED OTHER PEOPLE OF

19

CONSPIRING AGAINST HIM EVER?

20

A

NO.

21

Q

HAVE YOU SEEN OTHER EXAMPLES THAT YOU'D CARE

22

TO RELATE TO THE JURY OF A CHANGE IN PERSONALITY?

23

A

YEAH.

24

Q

WHAT HAVE YOU SEEN?

25

A

EMMANUEL IS LIKE IN HIS--IN COMPARISON, EMMANUEL
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1

BELIEVES THAT A CHILD SHOULD BEHAVE LIKE AN ADULT,

2

WAS IN HIS HOUSE WITH MY WIFE--

SO I

3

Q

WHEN?

4

A

IT WAS IN JULr.

5

Q

OKAY.

6

A

OKAY, I WAS IN HIS HOUSE WITH MY WIFE TO WHERE

7

WE ALL TALKING THEN THE KID WAS CRYING.

8

Q

THAT 1 S TORY?

9

A

YEAH, THE DAUGHTER.

ABOUT SIX MONTHS--

VICTORIA.

SO SHE GOES UP,

10

HE JUST GETS UP FROM THAT PLACE AND PICKS THE KID UP AND

11

THREW THE KID.

12

STARTED TO GET INTO THE BEDROOM.

13

SURPRISED WITH THAT btHAVlOR.

14

KNOWING THE FEELING OF THE WIFE YOU HAVE, AND THEN WENT TO

15

THE BEDROOM.

16

SHOULD YOU DO THIS.

17

TRATE ME.

18

Q

19

THEN THE WIFE GOT UP AND NOW, TRIED TO,
AT THAT TIME MY WIFE WAS

SHE GOT UP.

EMMANUEL CAME OUT.

I SAY, WOMAN,

I SAID EMMANUEL, WHY

HE SAID THE KID IS ALWAYS OUT TO FRUS-

HE SAID THE KID IS ALWAYS OUT TO FRUSTRATE ME?
MR. STEGALL:

YOUR HONOR, I APPRECIATE THE

20

PROBLEMS THAT WE'RE HAVING WITH COMMUNICATION BUT I THINK

21

THERE IS A LOT OF LEADING GOING ON THAT REALLY

22

NECESSARY.

23

JUDGE CROFT:

YES.

ISN'T

DON'T REPEAT EVERYTHING THAT

24 J YOU THINK HE SAYS, MR. SYKES.
25

MR. SYKES:

I JUST WANT TO MAKE CERTAIN THINGS
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ARE UNDERSTOOD, YOUR HONOR.
Q

(BY MR. SYKES)

OKAY.

GO AHEAD.

YOU WERE

SAYING?
A
ME.

SO HE SAID THIS KID IS ALWAYS OUT TO FRUSTRATE

I SAID, HOW DO YOU THINK A KID OF SIX MONTHS IS OUT

TO FRUSTRATE YOU.

SHE KNOWS WHAT SHE IS DOING.

HE IS

SUPPOSED TO KNOW A KID IS A KID NO MATTER WHAT, WHATEVER
THEY DO.

THEY ARE ALWAYS CRYING AND OTHER THINGS.

THERE-

FORE, YOU, AS A FATHER, TO BE PERSUADING THEM NOW AND NOT
TO GET ANGRY WITH WHAT SHE'S DOING.
EXPLODED ON ME AS WELL.
TO STAND AND SUPPORT.

YOU KNOW.

HE HIMSELF

HE SAID THAT ALWAYS TIME I LIKE
THAT'S WHY I SAID--

Q

I?ri SORRY, REPEAT THAT LAST SENTENCE.

A

HE SAID THAT'S WHY HE ALWAYS SAID I'M ALWAYS

AGAINST HIM.

I NEVER SUPPORTED WHATEVER HE SAID.

I

SUPPORTED HIM.
JUDGE CROFT:
MR. SYKES:

I THINK HE'S ANSWERED THE QUESTION,
IfM SORRY, YOUR HONOR, I DIDN'T

UNDERSTAND.
THE WITNESS:
ALWAYS AGAINST HIM.

I SAID HE ALWAYS SAID THAT I'M

I!M NOT AGAINST YOU, I'M JUST TRYING

TO EXPLAIN TO YOU JUST TO MAKE YOU UNDERSTAND.

I'M NOT

AGAINST YOU FOR WHATEVER.
Q

(BY MR. SYKES)

OKAY.

HAVE YOU SEEN ANY OTHER

PERSONALITY PROBLEMS THAT MR. ONYEABOR HAS HAD SINCE THE

292

1
2 J

ACCIDENT?
A

YEAH, HE FINDS IT DIFFICULT NOW TO COME WITH

3

KIDS, WITH FRIENDS, AND NOT OFTEN FRIENDS AS WE USED TO BE

4

BEFORE.

5

TO GET ALONG WITH THEM ANY MORE.

6

IN ANY CONVERSATION.

7

PREFER TO BE SILENT IN A CONVERSATION OR HE WILL START

8

JUMPING FROM ONE PERSON TO THE OTHER.

9

FRIENDS WILL BE ABLE TO KEEP TO YOU ESPECIALLY THE ONES THAT

HE HAS LOST A LOT OF THEM BECAUSE HE CAN'T BE ABLE
HE CAN'T EVEN PARTICIPATE

HE CAN'T PARTICIPATE.

IF HE WOULD

SO MOST OF THE

10

DON'T KNOW HIM MUCH, BUT SOMEONE WHO KNOW HIM THIS IS JUST

11

A PROBLEM THAT PS OVERLOOKED.

12

SO I HAVE TO KEEP IT UP WITH HIM AS A FRIEND.

13

Q

OKAY.

SO I APPEAR FOR MY BEHAVIOR,

MR. CHUKWU, WHEN DID YOU FIRST BEGIN--

14

YOU RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER OF '85.

15

DID YOU FIRST BEGIN NOTICING THESE PROBLEMS WITH MR.

16

ONYEABOR?

17

A

WHEN

I STARTED NOTICING THEM IMMEDIATELY THAT HE WAS

18

LIMPING AND UNABLE TO STAND UP, SIT UP RIGHT BECAUSE HE CAME

19

TO MY HOUSE.

20

Q

21

I'M SORRY, WHEN DID YOU FIRST BEGIN NOTICING

THE PERSONALITY

22

A

23

TO VISIT ME.

PROBLEMS?

RIGHT AWAY.

THAT IS THE TWO WEEKS WHEN HE CAME

THAT IS WHEN 1 STARTED TO SEE HIM AND--

24

JUDGL CROFT:

YOU'VE ANSWERED HIS QUESTION.

25

THE WITNESS:

AND--
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JUDGE CROFT:

JUST A MOMENT, PLEASE.

I WANT

YOU TO CONFINE YOUR ANSWER TO WHAT HIS QUESTION IS.
SAID, WHEN DID YOU FIRST BEGIN TO NOTICE IT,
WEEKS AFTER.
Q
6

HE

YOU SAID TWO

THAT IS AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION.
(BY MR. SYKES)

THAT ! S TWO WEEKS AFTER YOU

RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER OF

!

85?

7

A

YEAH.

8

Q

HAVE YOU NOTICED ANY MENTAL PROBLEMS OF MR.

9

ONYEABOR SINCE THE ACCIDENT?

BY "MENTAL" I MEAN THINGS LIKE

10

THINKING PROCESS, INTELLIGENCE, MEMORY, CONCENTRATION, THOSE

11

TYPES OF PROBLEMS.

12

PROBLEMS SINCE THE ACCIDENT?

HAVE YOU NOTICED ANY OF THOSE TYPES OF

13

A

YEAH.

14

Q

WHAT HAVE YOU NOTICED?

15

A

OKAY.

16

OF THINKING.

17

Q

SENSE OF THINKING?

18

A

YEAH.

19

Q

WELL, EXPLAIN THAT.

20

A

OKAY.

I'VE NOTICED THAT HE HAVE LOST HIS SENSE

I CALLED AT HIS HOME ONE DAY AND I JUST

21

CALLED HIM BECAUSE NORMALLY I WASN'T AROUND TO CALL TO FIND

22

OUT HOW HE IS DOING WITH THE FAMILY.

23

THE WIFE TOLD ME THAT, YOU KNOW, THAT HE ! S NOT HOME.

24

CAN YOU TELL HIM TO CALL ME.

25

SHE SAID HE WILL NOT BE THERE, HE WILL NOT BE COMING HOME

SO I CALLED UP.

SO
I SAID

AFTER TALKING WITH THE WIFE

29<+

1

THAT NIGHT,

2

WHAT IT MEANS FOR A MARRIED MAN TO BE, LIKE MYSELF, BEING

3

IN OGDEN AND SLEEPING OUTSIDE.

4
5

MR. STEGALL:

JUDGE CROFT:
SYKES.

MR. SYKES:

12

WELL, I AM TRYING TO DO THAT, YOUR

HONOR, AND NOT TO LEAD HIM AT THE SAME TIME.

10
11

CONTROL YOUR WITNESS MORE, MR.

JUST ASK HIM A SIMPLE QUESTION AND GET AN ANSWER.

8
9

YOUR HONOR, I THINK WE ARE GETTING

A LOT OF HEARSAY IN THIS ANSWER.

6
7

SO PARTICULAR TO ME, LIKE I'M MARRIED, 1 KNOW

JUDGE CROFT:

I KNOW BUT THESE YOUNG ONES TEND

TO MAKE A SPEECH IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION.
Q

(BY MR. SYKES)

OKAY, PATRICK, I WANT YOU TO

13 I COMMENT Oh ANY CnANGES, AN'i CnANGES, ANY MENTAL

PROBLEMS

14

THAT MR. ONYEABOR HAS HAD SINCE THE ACCIDENT.

15

AM TALKING ABOUT--WELL, LET'S JUST DO THIS.

16

NOTICED ANY PROBLEMS IN RIGIDITY OF THINKING, THINKING

17

PROCESS BEING TOO RIGID?

18

A

YEAH.

BY THAT I
HAVE YOU

THE WIFE GIVE ME A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL

19

WHERE HE WAS AT.

SO I PICKED UP A PHONE, I CALLED HIM, SO

20

I TOLD THE FRIEND TO PUT HIM ON THE PHONE IF HE IS THERE.

21

THE GUY SAID HE IS THERE.

22

SAID, OKAY.

23

HIM WHY HE SHOULD BE OUTSIDE AND SLEEPING THERE INSTEAD OF

24

SLEEPING AT HOME.

25

SHOULD I ALWAYS BE STARTING ASKING HIM.

I SAID, CAN I TALK TO HIM.

HE

HE PUT HIM ON THE PHONE SO I STARTED ASKING

THEN HE HIMSELF EXPLODED.

HE SAID WHY

I SAID, I f M NOT
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APPENDIX E

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-46

(2) Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished upon
a first conviction by imprisonment for a period of not less than five days
nor more than six months or by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than
$299, or by both such fine and imprisonment. On a second or subsequent
conviction, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than
ten days nor more than six months, or by a fine of not less than $50 nor
more than $299 or by both such fine and imprisonment.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, $35; C. 1943,
57-7-112; L. 1978, ch. 33, } 9.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1978 amendment deleted "or on a conviction under this section subsequent to a
conviction under an ordinance as provided in
section 41-6-43(b)" after "subsequent conviction" near the beginning of the second sentence of subsec. (2), substituted "$299" for
"$1,000" near the end of subsec. (2); deleted
the last two sentences of subsec. (2) which
provided that second violation had to occur
within three years of the preceding violation
and for suspension of license by department;
and made minor changes in phraseology and
style.
Former jeopardy.
Conviction of motorist for reckless driving
held not bar to subsequent prosecution for
involuntary manslaughter. State v. Empey
(1925) 65 U 609, 239 P 25, 44 ALR 558,
reviewed in State v Thatcher (1945) 108 U
63, 157 P 2d 258.
Collateral References.
Automobiles <3=> 330
61A CJS Motor Vehicles §§ 609-624.
Reckless driving, 7A AmJur 2d 499 et seq.,
Automobiles and Highway Traffic §312 et
seq.

"Assured clear distance ahead" or "radius
of lights" application of doctrine to accident
involving pedestrian crossing street or highway, 31 ALR 2d 1424.
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for automobiles, 29 ALR 883.
Homicide or assault in connection with
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 99
ALR 756.
Liability of one fleeing police for injury
resulting from collision of police vehicle with
another vehicle, person, or object, 51 ALR 3d
1226.
"Residence district," "business district,"
"school area," and the like, in statutes and
ordinances regulating speed of motor vehicles, 50 ALR 2d 343.
Statute prohibiting reckless driving; definiteness and certainty, 12 ALR 2d 580.
Validity, construction, and application of
criminal statutes specifically directed against
racing of automobiles on public streets or
highways (drag racing), 24 ALR 3d 1286.
Validity of statute or ordinance forbidding
running of automobile so as to inflict damage
or injury, 47 ALR 255.
What amounts to reckless driving, 86 ALR
1273, 52 ALR 2d 1337.
When automobile is under control, 28 ALR
952.

ARTICLE 6
SPEED RESTRICTIONS
Section
41-6-46.
41-6-47.
41-6-48.
41-6-49.
41-6-50.
41-6-51.
41-6-52.
41-6-52.1

Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds at intersections, crossings, and
curves — Prima facie speed limits — Emergency power of the governor.
Prima facie limit.
Speed Restrictions — Powers of local authorities.
Minimum speed regulations.
Special speed limit on bridges — Prima facie evidence.
Speed contest or exhibition on highway — Barricade or obstruction therefor.
Violation - Pleading.
Repealed.

41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds at intersections, crossings, and curves — Prima facie speed limits — Emergency power of the governor. (1) No person shall drive a vehicle at a
349

41-6-46

MOTOR VEHICLES

speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and
having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. Consistent
with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed
when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing,
when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest,
when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special
hazards exist with resi>ect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of
weather or highway conditions.
(2) Where no special hazard exists the following speeds shall be lawful
but any speed in excess of said limits shall be prima facie evidence that
the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful:
(a) Twenty miles per hour
When passing a school building or the grounds thereof during school
recess or while children are going to or leaving school during opening or
closing houjrs, provided, that local authorities may require a complete stop
before passing a school building or grounds at any of said periods.
(b) Twenty-five miles per hour in any urban district
(c) Fifty-five miles per hour in other locations.
The speed limits set forth in this section may be altered as authorized
in subsection (3) and sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48.
(3) The governor by proclamation, in time of war or emergency, may
change the speed on the highways of the state
History C 1953 41 6 46 enacted b> L
1978 (2nd S S ), ch 9 §1
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1978 (2nd S S ) , ch 9, § 1 repealed old
section 41-6-46 (L 1941, ch 52, §36, C 1943,
57 7 113, L 1951, ch 72, § 1, 1957, ch 76, § 1
1959, ch 66, § 1, 1978, ch 34, § 1), relating to
speed regulations, and enacted new section
41-6-46
Title of Act.
An act repealing and re-enacting section
41-6-46, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended by chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1957,
as amended by chapter 66, Laws of Utah
1959, as amended by chapter 34, Laws of
Utah 1978, and section 41 2 19, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 85
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by chapter
34 Laws of Utah 1978, relating to highway
speeds and points for certain speeding
offenses, providing for maximum speeds pro
viding for suspensions of licenses for certain
offenses, providing for the assessment of
points for certain violations and the basis for
and effect of such points, providing for new
licensure after suspension, and providing for
heanngs and re-examinations — Laws 1978
(2nd S S ), ch 9

Cross-Reference*.
Municipal regulations, 10 8-30
Reckless driving, 41 6 45
Construction and application.
This section requires that driver shall not
drive at speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent in view of existing conditions and
hazards on highway, that his speed shall be
controlled so as to avoid colliding with other
vehicles entering or upon highway in lawful
manner, and that speed shall be appropriately reduced when special hazards exist
with respect to other traffic or by reason of
weather conditions Horsley v Robinson
(1947) 112 U 227,186 P 2d 592.
Constitutionality.
A former speed law was held constitutional
as against contention that it violated Const
Art VI, §23 State v Brown (1928) 75 U 37,
282 P 785
Former jeopardy.
Conviction of motorist charged with
speeding under this section does not bar
subsequent prosecution for involuntary manslaughter State v Thatcher (1945) 108 U 63,
157 P 2d 258
Instructions.
,.
In action arising out of car-pedestrian accK
dent in California, evidence did not justify
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fully tried and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendant, the court's later ruling
granting defendant's motion to dismiss was a
nullity and the plaintiff could not appeal therefrom but should base any appeal upon the verdict and judgment and the rulings refusing to
vacate them. Roche v. Zee, 1 Utah 2d 193, 264
P.2d 865 (1953).

trial to determine amount of damages was improper since, in personal iniurv action, que*
tion of how accident happened, who was at
fault, and pain and injury occasioned thereby
are so intermingled that if trial is ordered, in
fairness to both parties, it should be on all is*
sues. Hyland v. St. Mark's Hosp., 19 Utah 2<j
134, 427 P.2d 736 (1967).

—Splitting of negligence and damages issues.
Judgment n.o.v. in favor of patient in personal injury action against hospital on the
question of negligence and ordering of new

Cited in Collier v. Frerichs, 626 P.2d 47$
(Utah 1981); Jepsen v. Tenhoeve, 656 P.2d 42j
(Utah 1982); Wilderness Bldg. Sys. v. Cbaft
man, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§ 106 to 151; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 463 et
seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 59 to 61;
88 C.J.S. Trial S§ 249 to 265.
A.L.R. — Dismissal, nonsuit, judgment, or
direction of verdict on opening statement of
counsel in civil action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's
argument or comment as to trial judge's re-

fusal to direct verdict against him, 10 A.L.R$1
1330.
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action
as affected by opponent's motion for summary
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.
Key N u m b e r s . — Judgment *=» 199; Trial •»•
167 to 181.

Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections.
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury fa
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall inform counsel of its
proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties
stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive this
requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all objections
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise,
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the fore^
going requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of
justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity
shall be given to make objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing «
the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has
instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case,
and if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1986 amendment, in the first paragraph, deleted "during
the trial" following "time" in the first sentence,
made a minor punctuation change in the sec-

ond sentence, and inserted "of" in the next-tolast sentence; and substituted "jurors" for
"jury" in the second sentence in the second
paragraph.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. JUT. 2d. — 47 Am J u r 2d Judgments
* 979 et seq
C.J.S. — 49 C J S Judgments §§ 574 to 584
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of

judgment against one joint tort feasor as re*
lease of others, 40 A L R 3d 1181
Key Numbers. — Judgment «» 891 to 899

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any ^
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in ari
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has beerf
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions trf
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a ne*g
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may Drder a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
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Rule 103

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v Gray, 717 P 2a 1313 lUtan
1986), State v Banner, 717 P 2d 1325 (Utah
1986)
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev 95, 130

Rule 103. Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making
of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) P l a i n e r r o r . Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 103 is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in conformity
with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), Rule 61 Utah Rules of C m l Procedure
and Utah case law not involving constitutional
considerations Subsection (aXD is in accord
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
and Stagmeyer v Leatham Bros, 20 Utah 2d
421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968) See also Bradford v
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980),

Szarak v Sandoval, 636 P 2d 1082 (Utah
1981) Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plain
e r r o r ^ l e See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence
( 1 9 7 1 ) and
S t a t e v P o e > 2 l Utah 2d 113, 441
po<\ 519 (1968)
~
_ _
„
.
,
Cross-References. - Harmless error m admission or exclusion of evidence, Rule 61
U R C P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general
Erroneous rulings
—Cumulative evidence
—Harmless error
—Objection
—Offer of proof
—Substantial right or prejudice
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Rule 402

Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and
proceedings.
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note — The text of
this rule is taken from Rule 302, Uniform
Rules of Evidence (1974) Presumptions in

criminal cases are not treated in this rule See
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-503 (1953)
or any subsequent revision of that section

ARTICLE IV.
RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS.
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evldence ,, means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable
in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a tendency to

prove or disprove the existence of any mate
nal fact n Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" accords with the application given to
former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court
State v Peterson, 560 P 2d 1387 (Utah 1977)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of remoteness
Cited
Effect of r e m o t e n e s s
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility Terry v
Zions Coop Mercantile I n s t , 605 P 2d 314
(Utah 1979)

Cited in State v Gray 717 P 2d 1313 (Utah
1986), State v Nickles, 728 P 2d 123 (Utah
1986)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L Rev 63, 78
United States v. Downing Novel Scientific

Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah
L Rev 839

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible
679
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Rule 403

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence The
change in language is not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be witnm the concept of
unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402
[Rule 403] See also Advisory Committee Note
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise "
See also Smith v Estelle 445 F Supp 647
(N D Tex 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric

testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and
violation of due process) See the following
Utah cases to the same effect Terry v Zions
Coop Mercantile Inst, 605 P2d 314 (Utah
1979), State v Johns, 615 P2d 1260 (Utah
1980), Reiser v Lohner, 641 P 2d 93 (Utah
1982)
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed reference to "Rule 403w in the Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice** and
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference
Cross-References — Admissibility of evi
dence Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALY8I8

Bias
Circumstantial evidence
Credibility of witness
Cumulative evidence
Determination of admissibility
Expert testimony
Film of murder scene
Guilty plea
Impeachment of witness
Inflammatory evidence
Other offenses
Photographic evidence
Prior convictions
Scientific evidence
Standard of review
Unfairly prejudicial
Victim's testimony
Bias
The right to cross-examine regarding bias is
limited by this rule State v Hackford, 737
P 2d 200 (Utah 1987)
Circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence, although relevant,
may nevertheless be excluded if the usefulness
of the evidence is more than counterbalanced
bv its disadvantageous effects in confusing the
issues before the jury or in creating an undue
prejudice in excess of its legitimate probative
weight Terry v Zions Coop Mercantile Inst
605 P 2 d 314 (Utah 1979)

Credibility of witness.
This rule is not to be used to allow the trial
judge to substitute his assessment of the credibility of testimony for that of the jury by excluding testimony simply because he does not
find it credible State v Branch, 743 P 2d 1187
(Utah 1987)
Cumulative evidence
While there may have been little reason to
admit into evidence transcripts of recorded
conversations between the defendant and a
government informant because the evidence
was cumulative, their admission was not sub-
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the backhoe had been maintained in a proper
condition by defendant even though the mechanic never observed, nor did ne have personal knowledge of, any specific acts by defendant or its employees that would constitute improper maintenance ShurtlefT v Jay Tuft &
Co, 622 P 2 d 1168 (Utah 1980)
—Witnesses at trial.
An expert's opinion may be based upon evi-

Rule 705

dence given at trial by other witnesses
Edwards v Didencksen, 597 P 2d 1328 (Utah
iy7yj (referred to in Advisory Committee
Note)
Cited in State v Suarez, 736 P 2d 1040
(Utah 1987)

Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue.
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with
Rule 56(4), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) See

Edwards v Didencksen, 597 P 2d 1328 (Utah
1979)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS*

In general.
Cited.
In general.
The expertise of the witness, his degree of
familiarity with the necessary facts, and the
logical nexus between his opinion and the facts
adduced must be established before an experts
opinion is admissible as to an ultimate issue
Ldwards v Didencksen, 597 P 2d 1328 (Uiah
1979) (referred to in Advisory Committee
Note)

Opinion testimony of expert witness was not
rendered inadmissible by fact that it may have
embraced the ultimate factual issue to be decided by the jury ShurtlefT v J a y Tuft & Co ,
622 P 2 d 1168 (Utah 1980)
Cited in ShurtlefT v Jay Tuft & Co , 622
P2d 1168 (Utah 1980)

Rule 705. Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert
opinion.
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim The substance of
this rule was formerly found in Rules 57 and
58, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) The requirement that an expert disclose the underlying facts or data for his opinion when cross ex
amined was formerly found in Rule 58 Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971) The discretion vested

in the trial judge to require pnor disclosure of
underlying facts or data should be liberally exercised in situations where there has not been
adequate discovery in civil cases or disclosure
in cnminal cases
Cross-References. — Scope of examination
and cross-examination, Rule 43(b), U R C P
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Chemical breath analysis.
Section 41-6-44.3, governing the admission
of chemical breath analysis, is a valid statutory exception to the hearsay rule Layton City
v Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct App. 1987).

Rule 803

the exclusion of evidence not subject to crossexamination concerning the truthfulness of the
matters asserted. State v. Long, 721 P 2d 483
(Utah 1986).

Purpose.
The hearsay rule has as its declared purpose

Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event
or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A
statement of the declarants then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a
matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in
his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions,
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term business" as
used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the
memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in
accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccur717
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rence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made
and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A)
the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to repprtr
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted byjb^;
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any
form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thei'eof
was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a
record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement,
or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose
the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, mar^
riages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or
marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in
a regularly kept record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of
fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or
other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting
to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time
thereafter.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings; on
rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or
tombstones, or the like.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The
record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in prop-:
erty, as proof of the content of the original recorded document and its
execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been
executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable
statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A
statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an
interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the
document, unless dealings with the property since the document was
made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
718
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(16) S t a t e m e n t s in ancient d o c u m e n t s . Statements in a document in
existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market r e p o r t s , commercial publications. Market quotations,
tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally
used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an
expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness
or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or
among his associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth,
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood,
adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of his personal or
family history.
(20) R e p u t a t i o n concerning b o u n d a r i e s or general history. Reputation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of
or customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events
of general history important to the community or State or nation in which
located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character
among his associates or in the community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment,
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo
contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain
the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments
against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may
be shown but does not affect admissibility.
(23) J u d g m e n t as to personal, family or general history, or
b o u n d a r i e s . Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general
history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be
provable by evidence of reputation.
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
719

